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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Corporate Governance and Long-Term Stock Returns. (May 2005) 
 
Theodore Clark Moorman, B.A., Wheaton College 
 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. James W. Kolari 
          Dr. Sorin M. Sorescu 
 
 
 Extant literature finds that long-term abnormal stock returns are generated by a 
strategy based on corporate governance index values (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
2003).  The result is inconsistent with efficient markets and suggests that information 
about governance is not accurately reflected in market data.  Control firm portfolios are 
used to mitigate model misspecification in measuring long-term abnormal returns.  
Using a number of different matching criteria and governance indices, no long-term 
abnormal returns are found to trading strategies based on corporate governance.  The 
effect of a change in governance on firm value is mixed, but some support is found for 
poor governance destroying firm value.  These results have a number of implications for 
practitioners, researchers, and policy makers.    
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1 Effects of Governance on Firm Value 
 
1.1.1 Introduction 
 
Corporate governance has been a recent source of interest to investors, policy 
makers, and corporations.  In the wake of recent corporate scandals, investors have 
asked what must be done to get corporations to maximize shareholder weatlh.  Policy 
makers have responded by passing legislation requiring corporate governance standards.  
Corporations have been working, not always without complaint, to meet the demands of 
the new laws.   
In Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) framework, the best interest of the agent-
manager is not always aligned with the principal-owner.  The structure of monitoring 
devices to align the interests of principals and agents describes a firm’s corporate 
governance characteristics (Farinha 2003).  Researchers, corporate managers, and 
shareholders are interested in the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
value.  A manager with partial ownership does not bear the full consequences of her 
actions and has incentives to deviate from maximizing shareholder wealth.  
Consequently, the value of the firm will be less than it would be if the manager had full 
ownership.  However, separating ownership and control has a purpose.  Managerial skill 
and wealth endowment are often mutually exclusive.  Additionally, diffuse ownership 
allows the bearing of risk to be shared (Fama and Jensen 1983).  Researching the effect  
____________ 
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of corporate governance on firm value attempts to address whether sufficient monitoring 
mechanisms exist.  Can a manager with partial ownership act more like a manager with 
full ownership who is also willing to bear a large degree of risk?                
1.1.2 Views of Governance and Firm Value 
Researchers hold a number of views about the effect of corporate governance on 
firm value.  The clearest dichotomy in the views is that either corporate governance 
affects firm value or it does not.  The nuances of each view have received the majority of 
the attention in the literature.   
 The view that governance affects firm value considers the costs of agency to be 
significant.  Governance mechanisms should be effective in reducing agency costs.  One 
nuance is that adding a particular governance mechanism improves firm value for all 
firms insofar as the mechanism can be added.  This could be called the no costs nuance.  
An example is Agrawal and Chadha’s (2005) study of the effect of boards of directors 
arrangements on accounting earnings restatement announcements.  Negative abnormal 
returns around earnings restatement announcement dates suggest that earnings 
restatements destroy firm value (Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz 2004).  Agrawal and 
Chadha (2005) study legislation from the Sarbanes-Oxley act.  The act requires at least 
one financial expert on the auditing committee of the board of directors.  Agrawal and 
Chadha (2005) find a lower likelihood of accounting earnings restatements for 
companies with a financial expert on the board of directors auditing committee.  The 
simple addition of a single governance mechanism, a financial expert on the board of 
directors auditing committee, is found to improve firm value. 
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 Another nuance consistent with governance affecting firm value is that 
governance mechanisms have costs and benefits.  All corporations can trade off the costs 
and benefits of a governance mechanism to maximize firm value.  The costs and benefits 
nuance is consistent with Stulz’s (1988) model of how the extent of managerial 
ownership affects takeover premiums and takeover likelihood.  As an inside manager’s 
ownership share increases, an outside bidder must offer a higher premium to make a 
successful bid; however, the gain for a bidder from a takeover decreases with the bid 
price.  If a takeover bid price is too high, no bid will take place.  Managers will be 
entrenched and will have fewer reasons to maximize shareholder wealth.  An optimal 
level of managerial ownership trades off the premium obtained from a higher bid and the 
value destruction from entrenched management in the case of low takeover probability.  
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) test Stulz’s (1988) theory.  Firm value, as 
approximated by Tobin’s Q, increases in board ownership of zero to five percent, 
decreases in board ownership of five to twenty five percent, and increases in board 
ownership above twenty five percent.  Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) interpret the 
non-linear relationship between ownership and firm value as supporting Stulz’s (1988) 
theory of an optimal level of ownership over most of the ownership level range.  The 
highest levels of ownership reflect close alignment of principal-agent interests because 
of less separation of ownership and control.  For firms with relatively diffuse ownership, 
this evidence implies that the marginal benefits of increased incentive alignment must 
equal the marginal costs of increased entrenchment when determining the best 
ownership level for the firm.   
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 A few differences can be seen immediately in the implications of the no costs 
and the costs and benefits nuances.  The no costs nuance implies that if the addition of a 
certain governance mechanism increases firm value, firm value should be improving 
insofar as one can keep adding that governance mechanism.  I will illustrate why the no 
costs nuance is extreme and suggest that most of the governance literature has not 
argued for the no costs nuance.  Yermack (1996) in a study on board size finds that 
smaller boards are associated with greater firm value.  Small boards improving firm 
value supports arguments made by Jensen (1993) that large boards are ineffective.  To 
the extent that a smaller board size causes greater firm value,  the no costs nuance 
implies that board members continually be taken away to increase firm value.  The 
problem with following such advice is that only a board of made up of management or 
no board at all (a legal impossibility) would remain.   Management would be 
unmonitored and unrestrained.  From the outset, the governance literature has not taken 
the no costs view.  Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) seminal work focuses on the costs of 
diffuse ownership.  They also point out that diffuse ownership creates value since 
entrepreneur managers are often wealth constrained.  The costs and benefits nuance is at 
least more realistic than the no costs nuance. 
 Governance may affect firm value significantly. However, most firms may have 
optimal governance structures.  In this case, a relationship between any single 
governance mechanism and firm value cannot be detected by a researcher.  This could be 
called the optimality nuance.  Demsetz and Lehn (1985) provide some of the economic 
intuition behind the optimality nuance.  In finding no relationship between ownership 
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structure and firm performance they conclude that no relationship should be expected.  
When shareholders make conscious decisions about ownership structure, they 
understand the costs and benefits of a particular ownership structure on firm value.  
Controlling for the other determinants of firm value and accounting for the way 
ownership concentration varies with firm characteristics, no relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm value should be expected. 
 Governance may affect firm value significantly and no relationship can be 
observed empirically for a number of reasons.  First, a number of governance 
mechanisms may be close substitutes or complements for each other.  In this case, no 
single governance mechanism would be necessary to solve agency conflicts.  Any 
optimal combination of governance mechanisms would be sufficient.  After controlling 
for the interdependence among a number of governance mechanisms, Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) detect only a negative effect of board outsiders on firm performance.  
Governance mechanisms included in the study are the use of debt, the market for 
managers, and the market for corporate control, inside shareholding, institutional 
shareholding, block shareholding, and board outsiders.   A second reason for observing 
no empirical relationship between governance and firm value may be that amenity 
potential and severity of agency costs may vary from firm to firm and by industry.  In 
this case, the unique situation that each firm faces plays an important role in choosing 
governance.  There can be no single governance standard improving value for all firms.  
Kole and Lehn (1999) argue that firms change their governance structure in response to 
a change in the underlying firm environment.  Deregulation in the airline industry 
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appears to cause a change in a number of governance mechanisms.  Finally, since all 
firms have incentives to choose the best form of governance no empirical relationship 
may be observed between firm value and governance.  Shareholders desire the 
maximization of firm value.  If inadequate governance is chosen and high agency costs 
are unrestrained, investors would move capital to better forms of governance.  Firms 
with high agency costs and poor governance structures may have difficulty surviving 
competitive product markets with insufficient capital.    
 Differences and similarities between the costs and benefits nuance and the 
optimality nuance should be noted.  The costs and benefits nuance implies that a 
relationship between governance and firm value can be observed empirically for all 
firms.  If such a relationship is detected, many firms are not choosing governance 
optimally.  Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) suggest that this is an out-of-equilibrium 
phenomenon that calls for a particular governance standard to be encouraged or 
mandated.  In this instance, some firms are not choosing an optimal form of governance.  
Both nuances fall under the heading of governance affecting firm value.  In the case of 
the optimality nuance, firms are on average choosing the optimal solution to agency 
problems.  Governance is not ineffective.  On the contrary, governance is effective – so 
effective that most firms have made sure their governance structures are optimal.     
 In direct contrast to governance having an important and material effect on firm 
value is the view that governance has no effect on firm value.  Two related nuances are 
worth mentioning.  First, governance may have no effect on firm value because 
governance is powerless or ineffective in curbing agency costs.  This could be called the 
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ineffectiveness nuance.  Jensen (1993) could come close to this view in citing the failure 
or shutdown of a number of governance mechanisms.  Jensen’s suggestions for 
reforming governance mechanisms indicate that governance mechanisms could be 
effective but are not effective currently. 
 A second nuance to governance having no affect on firm value is that agency 
costs are minimal at best.  This could be called the no agency costs nuance.  Literature 
declaring that no agency costs exist is scant.  With billions of dollars destroyed in the 
wake of the most recent corporate scandals, agency costs seem to be substantial.  
Perhaps voicing this view would suggest something counter to what seems obvious 
about human nature.  When humans are given the opportunity to use corporate resources 
according to their own preferences and without bearing large costs of doing so, they will. 
 Finally, a third view may bridge a gap between views arguing for the 
effectiveness or complete ineffectiveness of governance.  This could be called the trivial 
effect view.  Governance may affect firm value and agency costs may be real, but the 
impact of governance on firm value could be viewed as trivial in comparison with other 
economic factors.  A recent paper questions the importance of corporate governance.  
Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2004) use principal components analysis to construct 
common governance factors.  Governance explains only a small portion of the variation 
in a number of dependent variables related to firm value or firm performance.  In 
addition, many of the governance variables often have unexpected signs.  Larcker, 
Richardson, and Tuna interpret the relatively weak explanatory power of corporate 
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governance as inconsistent with claims often made by academics and consultants 
regarding corporate governance.      
1.1.3 Methodological Issues in Studying the Effect of Governance on Firm Value 
 
The difficult task for a researcher involves distinguishing between the many 
different views of the effect of governance on firm value.  The methodological hurdles 
are many.  The most severe methodological hurdle may be the problem of endogeneity.  
Least squares estimation assumes independent variables are non-stochastic or are 
uncorrelated with regression error terms.  Violations of this assumption result in biased 
coefficient estimates.  Endogeneity is econometrically defined in this manner. 
A primary manifestation of endogeneity in governance studies arises because 
explanatory governance variables are often determined simultaneously with dependent 
variables related to firm value.  A third omitted variable might determine both 
governance and firm value (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003).  As a result, researchers may 
detect a spurious correlation between governance and firm value.  The simultaneous 
equations bias proves troubling in examining a cross section of firms because one is 
unable to see how adjustments are made to shocks in the system.  Because variables of 
importance are determined simultaneously, the researcher faces the problem of 
determining the direction of causality.  A related question in the governance literature 
has been whether board composition determines firm performance or firm performance 
determines board composition.  A portion of the literature studying this question in a 
simultaneous equations framework has concluded that firm performance determines 
board composition (see Agrawal and Knoeber 1996 and Bhagat and Black 2002). 
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Among proposed solutions to the problem of endogeneity, two econometric 
methodologies have received attention in the literature.  One solution has been to search 
for instrumental variables for the endogenous or predetermined variables of interest in a 
system of equations.  Instrumental variables are to be an exogenous set of variables that 
come close to approximating the endogenous variables in the system of equations.  The 
new approximated variable of interest should be exogenous and uncorrelated with the 
error term in a set of equations.  Palia (2001) uses the instrumental variables approach to 
explore the relationship between firm value and managerial compensation.  He finds an 
insignificant relationship between firm value and compensation.  Palia interprets the 
insignificant relationship as an equilibrium condition in which firms choose the 
compensation mechanism of governance according to the contracting environment.  A 
number of problems may arise in the instrumental variables approach.  It may be 
difficult to determine which variables in a set of equations are exogenous.  Instruments 
for the endogenous variables in a system may be difficult to find.  Exogneous 
instruments may poorly approximate the endogenous variable of interest.  If instrumental 
variables are too highly correlated with the endogenous variable they approximate they 
may also be correlated with the error term.   
Another solution to the problem of endogeneity has been the use of panel data 
fixed effects.  One source of endogeneity may be omitted variables related to firms, 
industries, or years.  The effects of omitted variables are captured in the error term of a 
regression equation.  If the error term is correlated with independent governance 
variables of interest, coefficient estimates on governance variables will be biased.  To 
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control for the effects of variables related to firms, industries, or years a fixed effects 
panel data model looks at the variation of governance variables of interest within firms, 
within industries, or within years.  Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) use panel 
data fixed effects to control for differences in firm contracting environments possibly 
related to firm value.  In doing so, they find no significant relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance.  They interpret different levels of 
managerial ownership across firms as an “optimal incentive arrangement.”  Like the 
instrumental variables approach, a panel data fixed effects model is limited in controlling 
for omitted variables.  If the variable of interest in a regression equation is time 
invariant, as is often the case with governance studies, a fixed effects model will “wipe 
out” the variable and not allow for any interpretation.  Zhou (2001) critiques the study 
by Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) on these grounds because managerial 
ownership is rather time invariant.  Fixed effects can account for unobservable or 
omitted time invariant variables.  If an omitted or unobservable variable changes over 
time, fixed effects cannot control for the influence of this variable on test results. 
Another solution to the endogeneity problem is observing how an exogenous 
shock to one of the variables in a system of equations affects the other variables.  Dahya 
and McConnell (2002) use a “natural experiment” to examine changes in corporate 
behavior.  The U.K.’s Cadbury Report recommended at least three outsiders on a firm’s 
board of directors.  This recommendation would later be mandated.  Dahya and 
McConnell find an increase in the number of outside directors after the Cadbury Report 
is accompanied by an increase in the likelihood of an outside CEO appointment.  
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Outside CEO appointment announcements are accompanied by positive abnormal stock 
returns.  From this evidence, outside directors appear to make better decisions positively 
affecting firm value.  A number of obstacles arise in conducting a natural experiment.  
The first may be in identifying the exact timing of the shock.  Large macroeconomic 
events do not happen in isolation.  A number of confounding events may also occur 
whose effects could be the economic catalyst for change in a given variable.  Also 
debatable is whether a given event is truly a shock or a self-selected event.  If firms 
respond immediately and optimally to a given shock, no relationship would be observed 
between governance and firm value even though the effects of governance structures on 
firm value could be substantial. 
 Another method attempting to bypass endogeneity issues in the study of how 
corporate governance affects firm value is the event study.  Event studies examine the 
stock price reaction around the announcement date of a corporate event.  (Long-run 
event studies look at stock price performance up to five years after an event date.  Long-
run event studies test the efficient markets hypothesis).  Coates (2000) provides a survey 
of event studies on the adoption anti-takeover amendments.  He points out that event 
studies assume stock prices are unbiased estimates of firm value.  Even if stock prices 
are inaccurate, they are off by an amount close to zero on average in large samples.  
Coates concludes that the majority of the event study literature is inconclusive about the 
effect that anti-takeover amendment adoption has on firm value.  He also provides a few 
problems encountered in interpreting event study evidence.  Confounding 
announcements may have a material impact on event study outcomes.  Since events are 
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often self-selected, the stock price reaction to an event may be towards signaling 
information conveyed by an event rather than the event itself.  For instance, Coates 
(2000) suggests a “shadow pill” is always present for firms.  Since firms can easily adopt 
poison pills and similar anti-takeover amendments, actual adoption of a pill conveys 
nothing about the effect of a pill.  Instead, pill adoption may convey that the manager of 
a firm has private information (about takeover prospects, etc.). 
1.1.4 Conclusion 
 
A number of views can be found in the literature discussing the effect of 
governance on firm value.  Distinguishing between the many views of governance can 
be difficult.  For instance, detecting no empirical relationship between governance and 
firm value may lead one to conclude that governance has no effect on firm value.  
Another may conclude that firms choose governance optimally and governance plays an 
important role in mitigating agency costs.  In attempting to distinguish between views of 
governance, a researcher must overcome the problem of endogenously chosen 
governance structures.  Most empirical technology is limited in producing inferences 
with clear indications of causality.  On a brighter note, these are a few reasons why 
corporate governance has been and is likely remain an area for fruitful research.           
1.2 Market Efficiency and Long-Term Studies 
 
1.2.1 Introduction to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis 
 
Whether capital markets are efficient is of interest to academics and practitioners 
in the field of finance as well as investors and policy makers.  Policy makers want to 
know if market data contains useful information about the relevant risks to an institution.  
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Evidence on efficient markets should help investors trying to weigh the costs and 
benefits of active versus passive investment strategies.  The efficiency of capital markets 
has implications for investor asset allocation as well.  Practitioners are interested in 
whether exploitable inefficiencies exist.  Academics are probably interested in all of the 
above but would also like to know the benefits of financial reward equal the costs of 
financial risk or if an economic free lunch is possible.   
Commonly, the efficient markets hypothesis is subdivided into three forms.  In a 
weak form efficient market, current stock prices reflect all information contained in past 
market trading data.  If current stock prices reflect all publicly available information, the 
market is semi-strong form efficient.  Finally, strong form efficient markets reflect all 
information, public or private.  Another definition of efficient markets has probably 
received more attention in the literature as observed by most tests of the efficient 
markets hypothesis.  Malkiel (2003) defines an efficient market as one in which 
investors are not allowed to “earn above-average returns without accepting above-
average risks.”     
According to the latter definition, testing market efficiency requires a model of 
risk and return.  A model of normal returns must be used in order to conclude that some 
returns are abnormal.  Fama (1998) suggests that because an asset pricing model must be 
used to test the efficient markets hypothesis, tests of the efficient markets hypothesis are 
subject to a joint hypothesis.  When a researcher rejects market efficiency, the asset 
pricing model being used to test market efficiency may also be rejected.  Because of the 
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importance of models of risk and return in testing market efficiency, much of the debate 
over market efficiency has revolved around the joint hypothesis problem.           
1.2.2 Asset Pricing Models 
Models of expected returns have played an important role in the testing of the 
efficient markets hypothesis since a rejection of efficient markets involves finding 
abnormal returns.  Whether asset pricing models capture the risks or styles they claim to 
is a debate closely related to the literature on efficient markets.  Models of expected 
returns begin with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (Sharpe 1964).  Derived 
under the assumptions of competitive markets, homogeneous expectations, and rational 
agents, the capital asset pricing model implies that expected returns are a function of 
asset betas: 
    tfMifi RRERRE ])([)( −+= β    (1) 
 
 fR is the return on the risk-free rate.  MR is the return on the market portfolio.  
The market portfolio includes all assets of the security universe.  iβ , often referred to 
simply as beta, is the regression slope coefficient of a security return, iR , on the return of 
the market portfolio.  Early testing of the capital asset pricing model was supportive of 
the model.  Black, Jensen and Scholes (1973) found lower returns than the model 
predicts for high beta securities and higher returns than the model predicts for low beta 
securities.  Later tests look less favorably on the explanatory power of the capital asset 
pricing model’s beta.  In a later period of testing, the relationship between beta and stock 
returns does not exist (Fama and French 1992).  In addition, beta has a difficult time 
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explaining the returns to portfolios formed on size (price times shares outstanding) and 
the ratio of book value to market value. 
 The shortcomings of the capital asset pricing model have led to the use of multi-
factor asset pricing models.  Merton’s (1973) multi-beta capital asset pricing model and 
Ross’s (1976) arbitrage pricing theory provide the theoretical foundation for use of 
multi-factor models.  Merton’s (1973) multi-beta capital asset pricing model arises from 
investors’ demands to hedge undesirable states of nature.  Betas from the “state 
variables” in Merton’s model predict asset returns.  In Ross’s (1976) model, absence of 
arbitrage arguments necessitate economy wide risk factors with which assets covary.  
Assets that have greater covariance with economy wide risk factors have higher returns.  
Neither theory on multi-factor asset pricing says provides details about the state 
variables or risk factors.   
 Since size and book-to-market characteristics appear to capture a large portion of 
the variation in the cross-section of returns (Fama and French 1992), size and book-to-
market factors were used by Fama and French (1993) to augment the capital asset 
pricing model and create a multi-factor model: 
  tttt HMLSMBRfRmRfRi 321 )()( βββα ++−+=−   (2) 
 
SMB is the return on a portfolio long in small market capitalization stocks and short in 
big market capitalization stocks.  HML is the return on a portfolio long in high book-to-
market stocks and short in low book-to-market stocks.  This model captures 80 to 95 
percent of the variation in the returns of portfolios formed on book-to-market and size as 
observed by regression R-squareds.  Model intercepts, which are used to measure the 
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specification of the model, are significant at conventional levels for 3 out of 25 size and 
book-to-market portfolios.  Compared with about 10 out of 25 significant intercepts for 
the capital asset pricing model, the Fama and French (1993) multi-factor model seems 
better specified. 
 Although promising, the Fama and French (1993) model is also not without its 
shortcomings.  Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) show that returns to portfolios 
formed on past returns cannot be explained by the returns to stocks of differing size and 
book-to-market characteristics.  The past return phenomenon, dubbed momentum, is 
used by Carhart (1997) for studying the returns to mutual funds.  Carhart (1997) 
augments the Fama and French (1993) model with the momentum factor: 
 ttttt MomentumHMLSMBRfRmRfRi 4321 )()( ββββα +++−+=−  (3) 
 
where Momentum is the return on a portfolio long in stocks with high past returns and 
short in stocks with low past returns.   
 Although the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factors have been seen 
as imperfect from a theoretical standpoint (see Berk 1995), their use remains 
widespread.  One alternative to the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) 
multifactor models is perhaps another set of multifactor models.  Conditional asset 
pricing models of both the consumption variety and the market model variety have 
received a great deal of attention.  Conditional consumption models are well aligned 
with Breeden’s (1979) theory which provides an intuitive appeal when considering what 
risks are pertinent to investors (see Cochrane 2001).  Conditional asset pricing models 
have intuitive appeal and theoretical soundness.  However, the inability of conditional 
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models to empirically outmatch the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) multi-
factor models may contribute to the relatively limited use of the conditional models. 
 The Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) models used extensively in 
testing for long-term abnormal returns suffer from a few empirical deficiencies worth 
mentioning.  The large returns of the factors and their ability to explain the cross-section 
of returns may be a product of hindsight bias.  Large returns to size, book-to-market, and 
momentum strategies all begin to disappear when studied out of sample.  Returns to 
small stocks fade after 1982 and book-to-market returns shrink after 1994 (Schwert 
2002).  Momentum produces high negative returns during 2000 after positive returns in 
the late 1990s (Malkiel 2003).  Cooper, Gutierrez, and Marcum (2005) find that a 
hindsight portfolio made up of the largest size, highest book-to-market, and highest past 
return firms produces returns much larger than holding a market index.  However, when 
choosing the best portfolio in real time as approximated by a recursive out-of-sample 
method, active strategies based on size, book-to-market, and momentum fare no better 
economically than a market index.  Finally, the in-sample explanatory power of the 
factors is also suspect.  Daniel and Titman (1997) show that factor loadings on SMB and 
HML add no additional information in explaining the cross-section of stock returns after 
sorting on size and book-to-market characteristics.  Fama and French (1996) reject the 
null hypothesis of all regression intercepts equal to zero on their 3-factor model for 25 
size and book-to-market portfolios.  The multi-factor asset pricing models with the best 
ability to explain the cross-section of stock returns are empirically troubling.  Because of 
this, researchers testing the efficient markets hypothesis by examining long-term 
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abnormal returns have been prompted to explore a number of model correction 
methodologies.    
1.2.3 Long-Term Study Methodology 
Empirical challenges to asset pricing models have prompted researchers to 
develop a well specified and powerful methodology for measuring long-term abnormal 
stock returns.  Barber and Lyon (1997) compare two methods for measuring long-term 
abnormal returns.  Cumulative abnormal returns and buy and hold abnormal returns are 
examined using random sampling techniques.  Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are 
defined as the summed difference in returns over a sample period between the actual 
return on a sample firm and the expected return on a sample firm: 
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where )( ititit RERAR −= .  Buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are defined as the 
return on a buy and hold investment in a sample firm less the expected buy and hold 
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Barber and Lyon (1997) notice a number of differences between the cumulative 
abnormal return method and the buy and hold abnormal return method.  Test statistics 
are misspecified when using the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model to measure 
long-term cumulative abnormal returns.  However, when cumulative abnormal returns 
are measured with size and book-to-market matched control firms, test statistics are well 
specified and powerful.  Cumulative abnormal returns suffer from measurement bias.  
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They are biased estimators of buy and hold abnormal returns.  Barber and Lyon (1997) 
advocate using buy and hold abnormal returns since cumulative abnormal returns ignore 
the effects of compounding.  In particular, buy and hold abnormal returns using size and 
book-to-market matched control firms are considered well specified and powerful.   
 Mitchell and Stafford (2000) compare buy and hold abnormal returns to calendar 
time abnormal returns.  They suggest that test statistics are inflated when using buy and 
hold abnormal returns.  A buy and hold methodology often falsely assumes 
independence among event observations.  A bootstrapping procedure to correct for 
known biases of the buy and hold methodology does not account for the lack of 
independence among event study observations.  Using a test statistic for buy and hold 
abnormal returns accounting for the correlation between event study observations 
reduces the significance of test statistics.  Instead of using buy and hold abnormal 
returns, the authors advocate calendar time abnormal returns which use portfolios.  
Portfolios account for the correlation among observations through the portfolio’s 
variance term. 
 In the calendar time approach, portfolio returns are usually regressed on a factor 
model and the intercept term or alpha is examined for significance.  Non-event 
size/book-to-market portfolios have non-zero intercepts when regressed on the Fama and 
French (1993) model.  Mitchell and Stafford (2000) suggest using control firm portfolios 
to correct the model misspecification.  Control portfolios are created using non-event 
firms with size and book-to-market similar to event firms.  Because size and book-to-
market are similar for event and non-event portfolios, differences in size and book-to-
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market should not be the cause of return differences between portfolios.  In the case of 
long-term event studies, differences in abnormal returns from whether or not a firm has 
undertaken an event should be isolated in testing.  Using non-event control firm 
portfolios, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) are able to explain several long-term anomalies 
identified by previous researchers. 
 A recent set of papers has focused less on the test statistic used to measure long-
term abnormal returns and more on techniques used to overcome model misspecification 
and the joint hypothesis problem.  Li and Zhao (2003) and Cheng (2003) both examine 
the ability of a propensity score matching procedure to mitigate model misspecification.  
Most matching procedures used to correct model misspecification involve matching on 
two or three dimensions.  These papers point out that matching on two dimensions often 
ignores an important third dimension.  When using a three dimensional match, matching 
quality in two dimensions is achieved at the expense of one dimension.  This is referred 
to as the “curse of dimensionality.”  Li and Zhao (2003) and Cheng (2003) suggest that 
what is of interest in long-run event studies is the performance of a set of event firms 
relative to themselves had they not undergone the event.  A missing data problem occurs 
since it is impossible to observe the returns of event firms as if they did not undergo the 
event.  Propensity score theory shows that in the absence of randomization, the expected 
effect of an event can still be estimated by assuming the event is a function of observable 
variables.  Using a logit regression model, a propensity score or the probability that a 
firm will undergo an event is assigned to all firms.  Event firms are matched to non-
event firms based on propensity scores.  Li and Zhao (2003) and Cheng (2003) find that 
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firms undergoing secondary equity offerings (SEOs) do not have long-term buy and hold 
abnormal returns when compared to non-SEO firms with similar propensity scores.  This 
is striking considering that the extant literature consistently detects long-term abnormal 
returns for SEO event firms using the buy and hold methodology.   
 Other research attempts to move away from specifying a model of expected 
returns in order to avoid a joint hypothesis.  Abhyankar and Ho (2003) use non-
parametric stochastic dominance criteria to observe long-term performance from an 
investor preference perspective.  The return distribution of a portfolio composed of 
initial public offering (IPO) firms is compared to a number of benchmark portfolios.  
The first question asked is whether an IPO portfolio first order stochastically dominates 
or is dominated by a benchmark portfolio.  In order for one distribution to first order 
stochastically dominate another, better outcomes must always have higher probabilities 
for the dominating distribution.  As it turns out, no benchmark portfolios first order 
stochastically dominate IPO portfolios or vice-versa.  Abhyankar and Ho find that the 
CRSP value weighted index second order stochastically dominate the IPO portfolio.  
This means lower returns are assigned higher probabilities more often for the IPO 
portfolios.  Mathematically, the area under the cumulative density function of CRSP 
value weighted index returns is always less than the cumulative density function of IPO 
portfolio returns: 
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where B is the distribution of benchmark portfolio returns and I is the distribution of IPO 
portfolio returns.  No strong evidence of third order stochastic dominance, which 
indicates a preference for positive skewness, is found.  The authors provide some 
evidence that risk averse investors prefer benchmark portfolios to IPO portfolios.  They 
are quick to caution that theory provides little guidance towards an appropriate 
benchmark for long-term event studies.   
1.2.4 Interpretations of the Evidence 
After all testing and methodological tweaking is done (if it is ever really 
finished), the researcher is left with the “treacherous” task of interpreting the evidence.  
The meaning of a rejection of the efficient markets hypothesis is often debated.  In 
recent years, several behavioral theories have been constructed to explain the presence of 
long-term abnormal returns.  Many of them have been receiving increasing recognition.  
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) create a model of belief formation based on 
evidence in the literature of cognitive psychology.  In their model, cognitive biases of 
conservatism and the representative heuristic generate underreaction and overreaction to 
earnings based news.  Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) show theoretically 
that the cognitive biases of overconfidence and biased self-attribution result in over- or 
underreaction to private signals and incorrect updating to public signals.  Hong and Stein 
(1999) suggest that underreaction and overreaction can be generated by two groups of 
boundedly rational agents called “news watchers” and “momentum traders.”  The news 
watchers underreact to information privately revealed to them.  The momentum traders 
overreact to price movements caused by the news watchers’ trading activity.  The 
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underlying thought of the behavioral theories is that investors desire to accurately price 
assets, but cognitive biases act as an obstacle that prevents them from doing so.   
Alongside the behavioral theories have come a number of rational learning 
theories to explain seeming rejections of the efficient markets hypothesis.  Parameter 
uncertainty arising from changes in the dividend process generates predictability in 
Lewellen and Shanken’s (2002) model of investor learning.  Brav and Heaton (2002) 
show that underreaction and learning generate indistinguishable patterns in data.  In their 
model, both learning and underreaction are to changes in valuation-relevant parameters.  
A recent paper by Johnson (2004) provides a rational learning explanation for the 
negative relationship between stock returns and the dispersion of analysts forecasts, an 
empirical phenomenon previous researchers attributed to cognitive bias.  The rational 
learning theories are useful for explaining a lack of real-time and out-of-sample 
predictability despite the appearance of many in-sample predictable patterns.   
 Some advocate that empirical imprecision is the reason for the rejection of the 
efficient markets hypothesis.  Fama (1998) suggests that problems with the asset pricing 
model used to measure abnormal returns plague long-term studies.  He admits that the 
three factor model in Fama and French (1993) does not explain the size and book-to-
market portfolios the model was designed to explain.  Fama (1998) recommends a 
reasonable change in methodology as the solution to asset pricing model problems.  
Indeed, the long-term study literature changes constantly, and the new methods 
advanced usually seem more precise conceptually and statistically. 
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Another response to apparent rejections of the efficient markets hypothesis is that 
perceived inefficiencies are not exploitable.  If something is a true inefficiency, it should 
be an exploitable opportunity.  Malkiel (2003) points out that many anomalies and in-
sample predictable patterns may not be profitable after transactions costs or may be the 
result of data mining.  Inefficiencies that appear large in-sample often lack out-of-sample 
robustness.  If an inefficiency is real it may self destruct after exploitation by 
arbitrageurs, calling into question the type of parameter stability necessary to produce 
superior investment results.  The lack of exploitability of apparent inefficiencies may be 
observed by the lack of persistence in returns on the part of fund managers (see Carhart 
1997 and Malkiel 2003).  If an abundance of market inefficiencies exist and are 
exploitable, it seems reasonable that some skilled fund managers should be able to 
recognize the inefficiencies and profit from them.   
1.3 Governance and Market Efficiency 
 
 Recent research combines the literature on market efficiency and long term stock 
returns with the literature on corporate governance and firm value.  This research 
investigates whether firms with more shareholder rights as estimated by the absence of 
antitakeover amendments and charter provisions have abnormal long-run stock returns.  
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) use data on charter provisions and anti-takeover 
amendments from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) to classify firms 
as Democracies or Dictatorships.  They create a governance index that cumulates the 
number of “manager friendly” anti-takeover provisions contained in a firm’s charter.  
The governance index has a possible range from 0 to 24 and increases by one for every 
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manager friendly charter provision a firm has.  Firms with a governance index of 5 or 
less are classified as Democracies, and firms with a governance index of 14 or greater 
are classified as Dictatorships.  Every year the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
releases a new publication, portfolios are rebalanced.  Using the rise of the junk bond 
market and takeovers in the 1980s as an exogenous shock to the U.S. economy’s 
corporate governance equilibrium, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) conduct a long-
run event study.  They measure the long-run abnormal stock performance for 
Democracies and Dictatorships during the period from September 1990 to December 
1999.  A value weighted strategy long in a Democracy portfolio and short in a 
Dictatorship portfolio earns abnormal returns of 8.5% annually.  Abnormal returns are 
measured by the intercept or alpha from monthly regressions on the Fama-French (1993) 
three-factor model augmented with Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor.  The models 
estimated in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) that I replicate are as follows: 
 tttttDemocracy MomentumHMLSMBRMRFRfR 4321)( ββββα ++++=−  (7) 
 
 tttttipDictatorsh MomentumHMLSMBRMRFRfR 4321)( ββββα ++++=−  (8) 
 
     tttttipDictatorshDemocracy MomentumHMLSMBRMRFRR 4321)( ββββα ++++=−  (9) 
 
DemocracyR  is the return on the value weighted Democracy portfolio.  ipDictatorshR  is the 
return on the value weighted Dictatorship portfolio.  Rf  is the return on a one month 
treasury bill.  RMRF is the monthly value weighted return of the CRSP universe less the 
return on a one month treasury bill.  SMB is the return on small stocks minus the return 
on big stocks.  HML is the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low 
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book-to-market stocks.  SMB and HML are detailed in Fama and French (1993), pg. 9.  
Momentum is the return on high past return stocks minus the return on low past return 
stocks.  Momentum is detailed in Carhart (1997), pg. 61.     
 I show the original results obtained by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and 
replicate their results in Table 1.  All returns are monthly and value-weighted.  Panel A 
shows the original results from Table VI in their paper.  Panel B shows my replication of 
governance portfolio regressions on the four-factor model.  The replicated results are 
almost identical.  The Democracy portfolio earns positive and significant long-term 
abnormal returns as measured by the intercept from the Fama-French-Carhart four factor 
model.  The Dictatorship portfolio earns negative long-term abnormal returns.  Finally, 
the arbitrage portfolio buying Democracies and selling Dictatorships earns long-term 
abnormal returns of 8.5% annually based on the factor model intercept. 
 Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) conduct a number of other tests in addition to 
studying the long-run abnormal returns of Democracy and Dictatorship firms.  They 
study the difference in firm value between firms of differing governance index levels.  
Tobin’s Q, the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, is used as a 
proxy for firm value.  Firms with higher governance index levels or fewer shareholder 
rights are found to have lower firm value from regressions of Tobin’s Q on governance 
index levels.  Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) obtain similar results by examining the 
relationship between shareholder rights and accounting performance.  Firms with more 
shareholder rights have better accounting performance.   
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Table 1 
In Sample Replication of Calendar Time Regressions from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). 
 Firms are classified as Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios based on a governance index made 
of firm anti-takeover amendments and charter provisions from the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC).  A value of one is added to the index for each “manager friendly” charter provision a firm has.  
Democracies are defined as firms with 5 or fewer charter provisions.  Dictatorships are defined as firms 
with 14 or more charter provisions.  This table replicates the returns to a strategy based on a governance 
index calculated from anti-takeover amendments and charter provisions listed in publications by the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and detailed in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).  The 
Democracy portfolio ( )5≤G , the Dictatorship portfolio ( )14≥G , and a hedge portfolio long in the 
Democracy portfolio and short in the Dictatorship portfolio are regressed on the Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model.  Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios are in excess of the return on a one month treasury bill.  
RMRF is the monthly value weighted return of the CRSP universe less the return on a one month treasury 
bill.  SMB is the return on small stocks minus the return on big stocks.  HML is the return on high book-to-
market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks.  SMB and HML are detailed in Fama and 
French (1993), pg. 9.  Momentum is the return on high past return stocks minus the return on low past 
return stocks.  Momentum is detailed in Carhart (1997), pg. 61.  alpha measures the abnormal returns to 
holding any portolio.  Portfolios are rebalanced in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, and February 
1998 when the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) releases new data.  Panel A shows the 
original results in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).  Panel B replicates their results.  All returns are 
monthly and value weighted.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance at the five-percent 
and one-percent levels is indicated by * and **. 
 
 Panel A: Original results by GIM, table VI (Sept. 1990 – Dec. 1999) 
 
Governance Portfolio alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
 
     
GIM Democracy-Dictatorship 0.71** -0.04 -0.22* -0.55** -0.01 
 (0.26) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) 
      
GIM G<=5 (Democracy) 0.29* 0.98** -0.24** -0.21** -0.05 
 (0.13) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
      
GIM G>=14 (Dictatorship) -0.42* 1.03** -0.02 0.34** -0.05 
 (0.19) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) 
 
Panel B: Replication of GIM results on Four-Factor Model (Sept. 1990 – Dec. 1999) 
 
Governance Portfolio alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
 
     
Democracy-Dictatorship 0.70** -0.05 -0.22* -0.55** -0.01 
 (0.25) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) 
      
G<=5 (Democracy) 0.30* 0.99** -0.24** -0.21** -0.06 
 (0.14) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
      
G>=14 (Dictatorship) -0.40* 1.04** -0.02 0.34** -0.05 
 (0.18) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) 
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 The relationship between governance and firm value is not without precedent in 
extant literature.  However, the relationship between governance and long-term 
abnormal stock returns is new and surprising.  The results found in Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) imply that an investor who took a position long in a portfolio of 
shareholder friendly firms and short in a position of manager friendly firms would have 
earned 85 percent over the period of the 1990s after adjusting for investment style and 
risk.  The huge returns after adjusting for style and risk are the reason the paper has 
caught the attention of business media and academics.   
 Huge returns after adjusting for style and risk for portfolios formed on 
information about corporate governance are inconsistent with semi-strong form efficient 
markets.  If capital markets are efficient, any relationship between governance and firm 
value should be reflected in security prices as soon as the information about governance 
is revealed.  In the long run, firms should earn their cost of equity or their required rate 
of return (see Fama 1988), and there should be no difference in the long-run abnormal 
returns of firms with different governance index values.  To illustrate, consider a simple 
rational expectations framework with two all equity firms that have similar costs of 
equity and a similar value of book assets.  For both firms, all cash flows are paid out to 
shareholders in the form of dividends.  The difference between the two firms is that one 
firm has a higher governance index value or poorer shareholder rights than the other.  
Firm L with a low governance index value has expected future cash flows of $20 million 
a year.  Firm H with a high governance index value could have the same cash flows as 
firm L with a low governance index value.  Instead, firm H has expected future cash 
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flows of $10 million because of the potential for increased managerial entrenchment 
from more anti-takeover amendments and the resulting expropriation of shareholder 
wealth.  If both firms have costs of equity of 10 percent a year and book assets of $100 
million, firm L has a present value of expected future cash flows of $200 million and a 
market-to-book ratio of 2.  The present value of firm H’s cash flows are much less at 
$100 million and a market-to-book ratio of 1.  If the information about expected future 
cash flows, the cost of equity, and how the level of the governance index affects 
valuation inputs are public, semi-strong form efficient markets could value a firm with a 
lower governance index value differently.  After the market values firms, however, 
investors should earn the firm’s cost of equity.  Firm L investors should earn its cost of 
equity at 10 percent or $20 million divided by $200 million.  Likewise, investors in the 
firm with a higher governance index value, firm H, should also earn the firm’s cost of 
equity at 10 percent or $10 million divided by $100 million. 
 To explain the inconsistency with efficient markets for the long-term abnormal 
returns to a strategy based on information about corporate governance, Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003) propose that high agency costs to firms with fewer shareholder rights 
were unexpected.  Firms with fewer shareholder rights had more capital expenditures 
and acquisitions.  Insofar as capital expenditures and acquisitions are negligent uses of 
corporate resources or inefficient investment (see Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Bruner 
(2002) for a number of views on motives for acquisitions), firms that engage in those 
activities would have higher agency costs.  Since investors did not understand the 
relationship between shareholder rights and agency costs, long-term abnormal stock 
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returns are said to reflect investor learning.  Investors would have to learn how 
shareholder rights would affect the agency costs impacting firm value.   
 Another explanation for the anomalous long-term abnormal returns to a trading 
strategy based on corporate governance is offered by Cremers and Nair (2004).  Cremers 
and Nair replicate the results in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and extend the 
sample period to 2001.  From 1990 to 2001, a governance strategy generates annual 
abnormal returns of 7.5%.  A governance strategy produces abnormal returns in the 
range of 10% to 15% annually when employed for firms with high institutional 
ownership.  A strategy based on institutional ownership alone earns near zero long-term 
abnormal returns, suggesting that the large abnormal returns are still driven by sorts on 
the governance index as defined by the number of anti-takeover amendments.  Cremers 
and Nair suggest that firms with more shareholder rights may be riskier than firms with 
fewer shareholder rights.  They examine Tobin’s Q and a measure of the standard 
deviation of profitability to come to this conclusion.  Higher Qs are reported for firms 
with more shareholder rights or large blockholders.  When firms have both high 
shareholder rights and large blockholders, Qs are statistically lower than when firms just 
have high shareholder rights or large blockholders.  The standard deviation of 
profitability measures are higher for the firms with both large shareholders and high 
shareholder rights than for firms with only large blockholders.1 Q is used as a measure of 
valuation and standard deviation of profitability measures may be used to represent the 
firm’s discount rate.  Cremers and Nair interpret lower Q’s for firms with higher 
shareholder rights and large blockholders accompanied by higher returns and higher 
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standard deviation of profitability measures as being consistent with higher risk.  Since 
firms can have different Qs and similar risk, as demonstrated in an earlier explanation of 
firm valuation and efficient markets, their interpretation comes with a degree of 
difficulty.  Their interpretation of firm Qs and returns does not explain the higher Qs for 
firms with higher returns found in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).  Firms with better 
governance or fewer agency costs being more risky seems counterintuitive and contrary 
to other evidence.  Lemmon and Lins (2003) find that firms who separate control and 
cash flow ownership have lower stock returns during the Asian financial crisis compared 
to other firms.  This is interpreted as a greater expropriation of shareholder wealth during 
bad times by firms with poor ownership structures where ownership structure is a 
governance mechanism.  Jensen (2004) suggests that better governance could help 
mitigate the agency costs of equity overvalued relative to insider information.  Poor 
governance encourages managers to seek fraudulent activities that further inflate firm’s 
stock price beyond an amount supported by managerial performance.  Such fraud results 
in the destruction of billions of dollars of real value.  Combining the views in Lemmon 
and Lins (2003) and Jensen (2004) would suggest that firms with poorer governance 
have greater cash flow volatilities and are in some sense riskier.  Cremers and Nair 
(2004) admit that an absence of any theory about corporate governance and risk makes 
disentangling their risk explanation from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick’s (2003) learning 
explanation difficult in the presence of inconclusive evidence.    
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1.4 Notes 
1.  No test statistics are given to see whether the standard deviations of profitability 
measures are statistically different between different groups.  Additionally, the 
difference in standard deviations of profitability measures between high shareholder 
rights/large blockholders and high shareholder rights/no large blockholders is not shown 
or discussed.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
GOVERNANCE AND LONG-TERM ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 I reexamine the long term abnormal returns found in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003) since the result is inconsistent with efficient markets.  Rejections of the efficient 
markets hypothesis may be interpreted a number of ways.  Fama (1998) mentions 
problems with the asset pricing model used to measure abnormal returns.  He admits that 
the three factor model in Fama and French (1993) does not explain the size and book-to-
market portfolios the model was designed for.  Fama (1998) recommends a reasonable 
change in methodology as a solution to model misspecification and advocates the 
approach used by Mitchell and Stafford (2000).   
 Methodological problems in detecting long-run abnormal returns are based on 
the following argument:  Researchers must first specify a model of expected returns in 
order to measure long-term abnormal returns.  Using a misspecified model of expected 
returns may lead to spurious detection of long-term abnormal returns (Fama 1998).  
Specifically, a model of expected returns that cannot explain the returns to randomly 
sorted portfolios is problematic.  A misspecified model will be biased towards detecting 
long-term abnormal returns (when none, in fact, exist) for any portfolio having the same 
characteristics as unexplained portfolios from random sorts.  To address model 
specification problems, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) recommend the use of control firm 
portfolios.  
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 In Mitchell and Stafford (2000), a factor model based on the returns of size and 
book-to-market portfolios is not well specified (as evidenced by a large number of 
significant intercepts for randomly sorted portfolios).  This is consistent with the 
rejection of model intercepts being jointly zero for twenty five size and book-to-market 
portfolios in Fama and French (1996).  In long-term corporate event studies testing for 
abnormal returns, control portfolios are created using non-event firms with size and 
book-to-market similar to event firms.  Because size and book-to-market are similar for 
event and non-event portfolios, differences in size and book-to-market should not be the 
cause of return differences between portfolios.  In the case of long-term event studies, 
differences in abnormal returns from whether or not a firm has undertaken an event 
should be isolated in testing.  Using non-event control firm portfolios, Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) are able to explain several long-term performance anomalies identified 
by previous researchers.  
2.2 Data and Methods 
 
2.2.1 Data 
 
 The sample used in this paper contains all firms in the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC) universe (except firms with dual class shares).  Firms must 
have a governance index, stock returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) and data on book value of equity from COMPUSTAT.  This sample of firms can 
be found on Andrew Metrick’s website.1 The governance index has a possible range 
from 0 to 24 and increases by one for every manager friendly charter provision a firm 
has.  Firms with a governance index of 5 or less are classified as Democracies, and firms 
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with a governance index of 14 or more are classified as Dictatorships.  Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003) have a more detailed description of the governance index and its 
construction.  I construct monthly value weighted calendar time portfolios for 
Democracy and Dictatorship firms. 
 Throughout the paper, monthly portfolio returns are regressed on the Fama-
French-Carhart (1997) four-factor model: 
 ttttt MomentumHMLSMBRfRmRfRi 4321 )()( ββββα +++−+=−  (10) 
RMRF is the value weighted monthly return to the Center for Research in Security Prices 
universe less the return on a one-month treasury bill.  SMB is the return to small stocks 
less the return on big stocks.  HML is the return to high book-to-market equity stocks 
less the return on low book-to-market equity stocks.  Momentum is the return on high 
past return stocks (winners) minus the return on low past return stocks (losers).2  I also 
use the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries.  All industry data and factors can be 
obtained from Kenneth French’s website except for Momentum which was obtained 
from Mark Carhart.3 All other data are from the Center for Research in Security Prices. 
2.2.2 Creating Matching Portfolios 
 
 Control firm portfolios may better measure long-term abnormal returns for a few 
reasons.  First, previous literature shows asset pricing models cannot explain all the 
returns from the dimensions they were designed to explain.  Fama and French (1993) 
find a number of size and book-to-market portfolios with significant intercepts from 
regressions on a model including a size and a book-to-market factor.  This result shows 
up again in Mitchell and Stafford (2000).  Fama (1998) recognizes this problem and 
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advocates matching portfolios as a viable alternative to asset pricing models.  Second, a 
number of long-term anomalies have been explained by using a control firm portfolio 
approach; however, using such an approach does not guarantee an anomaly will 
disappear.  Mitchell and Stafford (2000) find no long-term abnormal returns for events 
previous researchers found underreaction for; however, the negative long-term abnormal 
returns to bidders financing acquisitions with stock persist despite the matching portfolio 
adjustment.  Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique (2004) find that long term abnormal 
returns following R&D increases persist even after using matching portfolios based on 
size, book-to-market and momentum.  Finally, factor loadings may explain the cross-
section of returns better than firm characteristics.  Daniel and Titman (1997) show that 
factor loadings on SMB and HML add no additional information in explaining the cross-
section of stock returns after sorting on size and book-to-market characteristics. 
 Size, book-to-market, and momentum are chosen as matching characteristics for 
a number of reasons.  First, size, book-to-market, and momentum are the firm 
characteristics upon which the Fama-French-Carhart factors are constructed used to 
initially measure abnormal returns.  Since long-term abnormal returns are measured by a 
model with size, book-to-market, and momentum factors, the conclusion from the past 
literature is that governance characteristics generate a cross-sectional spread in returns 
independent of the spread in returns generated by size, book-to-market, and momentum.    
Second, prior literature supports the independent cross-sectional explanatory power of 
all three characteristics (Fama and French 1992, Jegadeesh and Titman 1993).  Third, 
asset pricing models with size and book-to-market factors cannot explain all of the 
  37   
returns to size and book-to-market portfolios (Fama and French 1993).  Size and book-
to-market portfolios present a challenge to asset pricing models.  Momentum portfolios 
may pose a similar challenge to asset pricing models; however, I am not aware of prior 
literature investigating the ability of a past return factor to explain returns to randomly 
sorted past return portfolios.  
 Because information on the governance index is available through the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center universe, I use the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center universe to create control firm portfolios.  Additionally, portfolios based on the 
governance index from the Investor Responsibility Research Center universe generate 
long-term abnormal returns in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).   If I collect the 
sample outside of the Investor Responsibility Research Center universe, I could not be 
certain of the governance index value of the control firm portfolios.  To test whether 
high governance or low governance index values generate long-term abnormal returns, I 
create a control firm portfolio with a governance index ranking different from the 
governance portfolio being tested.  For example, the control portfolio for the Democracy 
portfolio contains firms that are not Democracies, but are otherwise similar in size, 
book-to-market and momentum to Democracy firms.  I refer to this as the CTRL-
Democracy portfolio.  Likewise, the CTRL-Dictatorship portfolio contains firms that are 
not Dictatorships but are otherwise identical to firms in the Dictatorship portfolio. 
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2.3 Tests and Results 
 
2.3.1 Control Firm Portfolios and Model Specification 
 
2.3.1.1 Control Firm Portfolio Description 
 
 First, I replicate the results of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) to ensure that 
long-term abnormal returns as measured by the Fama-French-Carhart model can be 
generated with governance portfolios (see Table 1).  In Table 2, I construct a CTRL-
Democracy portfolio by matching the non-Democracy firms with Democracy portfolio 
firms in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, and February 1998 when the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center publications are released.  Likewise, I construct the 
CTRL-Dictatorship portfolio by matching non-Dictatorship firms with Dictatorship 
firms in a similar manner.  The CTRL-Democracy and CTRL-Dictatorship firms match 
the Democracy and Dictatorship firms on the dimensions of size, book-to-market, and 
momentum.  To construct the CTRL-Democracy portfolio, all non-Democracy firms in 
the IRRC universe within 60% to 140% of a Democracy firm’s book-to-market are kept.  
From the non-Democracy firms left, control firms within 90% to 110% of a Democracy 
firm’s momentum are kept.  Finally, non-Democracy firms closest in size are kept.  The 
CTRL-Dictatorship portfolio is formed in a similar fashion. 
 Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for governance and control firm portfolios.  
Statistics are shown only for Democracy and Dictatorship firms with matching control 
firms.  However, all Democracy and Dictatorship firms are used in the governance 
portfolios throughout the paper.  Limiting the Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios to 
firms with a control firm match does not affect inferences.  Panel A of table 2 shows 
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descriptive statistics for the governance index of all portfolios.  The CTRL-Democracy 
portfolio has an average governance index of 9.6 which is near the mean governance 
index for the entire IRRC universe of around 9.0.4 The governance index of any firm in 
the CTRL-Democracy portfolio is never less than 6.  The CTRL-Democracy portfolio 
could be considered a governance neutral portfolio or a non-Democracy portfolio.  Panel 
B shows that the CTRL-Dictatorship portfolio has an average governance index of 9.1 
and any firm in the portfolio never has a governance index greater than 13.  The CTRL-
Dictatorship could also be considered governance neutral.  Governance firms have 
governance index values of near zero correlation with the governance index values of 
control firms.  Governance portfolios and control firm portfolios differ on the dimension 
of governance.   
 Panels B, C, and D in table 2 show a greater similarity between governance and 
control firms for the three dimensions used to find the control firms.  Consistent with the 
literature on propensity score matching, the three dimensional match appears to sacrifice 
the matching quality for one dimension (Li and Zhao 2003 and Cheng 2003).  
Correlations between governance and control firms are lower for size as compared to 
book-to-market and momentum.  The correlations for size range from .43 to .78, whereas 
correlations for book-to-market and momentum hover around .92 and 1.00 respectively.  
However, larger size on average and a greater dispersion in size for Democracy firms is 
reflected in the size statistics for CTRL-Democracy firms.  Table 2 shows that other than 
the dimension of governance, control portfolios are quite similar to governance 
portfolios.   
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Table 2 
Portfolio Descriptive Statistics. 
 Firms are classified as Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios based on a governance index made 
of firm anti-takeover amendments and charter provisions from the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC).  A value of one is added to the index for each “manager friendly” charter provision a firm has.  
Democracies are defined as firms with 5 or fewer charter provisions.  Dictatorships are defined as firms 
with 14 or more charter provisions.   
 Using the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) universe, control firm portfolios are 
created for Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios.  To create a control firm portfolio for the Democracy 
portfolio, only IRRC firms with a governance index value greater than 5 are possible candidates.  To 
create a control firm portfolio for the Dictatorship portfolio, only IRRC firms with a governance index 
value less than 14 are possible candidates.  In September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, and February 1998 
firms are found that match the Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios on the basis of size, book-to-market 
and momentum.  To find matching firms, all CTRL-Democracy firms in the IRRC universe within 60% to 
140% of a Democracy firm’s book-to-market and all CTRL-Democracy firms within 90% to 110% of a 
Democracy firm’s momentum are kept.  Finally, control firms with the closest size are kept.  A CTRL-
Dictatorship portfolio is formed in a similar fashion to the CTRL-Democracy portfolio.   
Panel A shows average governance index values at the matching dates for each portfolio.  Panel B shows 
descriptive statistics of each portfolio for size (price times shares outstanding divided by 1000).  Panel B 
shows descriptive statistics of each portfolio for book-to-market equity.  Panel C shows descriptive 
statistics of each portfolio for past 11 month momentum.  632 matches between Democracies and CTRL-
Democracies are possible.  348 matches between Dictatorships and CTRL-Dictatorships are possible.  All 
Democracy and Dictatorship firms are used throughout the paper to make up the governance portfolios.  
Limiting the governance portfolios to firms with a control firm does not affect inferences.   
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of the Portfolio Governance Index (September 1990, July 1993, July 
1995, and February 1998) 
 
Portfolio Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Correlation 
       
Democracy 543 4.4 0.8 2 5  
       
CTRL-Democracy 543 9.6 2.5 6 17 -0.021 
       
Dictatorship 323 14.6 0.8 14 18  
       
CTRL-Dictatorship 323 9.1 2.6 2 13 -0.016 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Portfolio Size (September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, and 
February 1998) 
 
 
Portfolio Observations Mean Standard Deviation Correlation 
     
Democracy 543 3311 9738  
     
CTRL-Democracy 543 2692 9464 0.434 
     
Dictatorship 323 2817 5721  
     
CTRL-Dictatorship 323 2529 5914 0.781 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of Portfolio Book-to-Market (September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, 
and February 1998) 
 
Portfolio Observations Mean Standard Deviation Correlation 
     
Democracy 543 0.61 0.48  
     
CTRL-Democracy 543 0.57 0.41 0.927 
     
Dictatorship 323 0.67 0.52  
     
CTRL-Dictatorship 323 0.62 0.45 0.924 
 
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics of Portfolio 11 Month Momentum (September 1990, July 1993, July 
1995, and February 1998) 
 
Portfolio Observations Mean Standard Deviation Correlation 
     
Democracy 543 15.34 35.42  
     
CTRL-Democracy 543 15.06 35.33 0.998 
     
Dictatorship 323 14.16 28.06  
     
CTRL-Dictatorship 323 13.94 28.27 0.998 
 
 
   
2.3.1.2 Adjusted Calendar Time Abnormal Returns 
 
 Using the hedge portfolio methodology of Mitchell and Stafford (2000), I test 
whether the long term abnormal returns to the governance based strategy can be 
attributed to asset pricing model problems.  The method consists of building a zero-
investment calendar-time portfolio with a long position in a governance portfolio and a 
short position in the respective control portfolio.  The monthly returns of this hedge 
portfolio are either averaged intertemporally (Panels A and B of Table 3) or regressed on 
the four factors (Panels C and D of Table 3).  The resulting intercept provides a good 
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indication of the magnitude of the long-term abnormal returns after correcting for 
misspecifications in the asset-pricing model. 
 In panels A and B of Table 3, raw returns from control portfolios are used as 
benchmark portfolios for the Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios.  The returns 
generated from the control portfolios are subtracted from the returns on the Democracy 
and Dictatorship portfolios every month to obtain the calendar time abnormal returns.  
Time series standard errors are used to test monthly calendar time abnormal returns for 
significance.  In Panel A, I observe the mean monthly calendar time abnormal return of 
the Democracy portfolio.  The Democracy portfolio earns negative and insignificant 
long-term abnormal returns of 0.15%.  A similar result is observed in Panel B for the 
Dictatorship portfolio: 0.24% a month and statistically insignificant.  In panels C and D, 
the returns on control firm portfolios are subtracted from the returns on Democracy and 
Dictatorship portfolios.  The excess returns are regressed on the four Fama-French-
Carhart factors to obtain the adjusted alphas or adjusted abnormal returns.  In panel C, 
the adjusted alpha for the Democracy portfolio is a negative 0.03% per month and 
insignificant.  In panel D, the Dictatorship portfolio has an adjusted alpha of 0.12% per 
month and is also insignificant.  Using unadjusted four-factor alphas would 
underestimate abnormal returns for firms with low governance index values and 
overestimate abnormal returns for firms with high governance index values.  After trying 
to mitigate model misspecification, I observe no long term abnormal returns relating to 
governance index values.  From Table 3, neither Democracies nor Dictatorships earn 
long term abnormal returns after controlling for size, book-to-market, and momentum. 
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Table 3 
Adjusted Calendar Time Abnormal Returns. 
 Firms are classified as Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios based on a governance index made 
of firm anti-takeover amendments and charter provisions from the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC).  A value of one is added to the index for each “manager friendly” charter provision a firm has.  
Democracies are defined as firms with 5 or fewer charter provisions.  Dictatorships are defined as firms 
with 14 or more charter provisions.  RMRF is the monthly value weighted return of the CRSP universe 
less the return on a one month treasury bill.  SMB is the return on small stocks minus the return on big 
stocks.  HML is the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks.  
SMB and HML are detailed in Fama and French (1993), pg. 9.  Momentum is the return on high past return 
stocks minus the return on low past return stocks.  Momentum is detailed in Carhart (1997), pg. 61.  alpha 
measures the abnormal returns to holding any portolio.  Portfolios are rebalanced in September 1990, July 
1993, July 1995, and February 1998 when the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) releases 
new data.   
 CTRL-Democracy and CTRL-Dictatorship portfolios are formed on book-to-market, size, and 
momentum.  Panel A shows calendar time abnormal returns for the Democracy portfolio.  Expected 
returns obtained from the CTRL-Democracy portfolio and are subtracted each month from Democracy 
portfolio returns to get abnormal returns.  Time series standard errors from the monthly abnormal returns 
are used to test for significance.  Panel B shows calendar time abnormal returns for the Dictatorship 
portfolio.  Abnormal returns are calculated and tested in a similar fashion to the Democracy portfolio.  
Panel C shows the adjusted calendar time alpha for the Dictatorship portfolio.  Every month CTRL-
Democracy portfolio returns are subtracted from Democracy portfolio returns and are regressed on a four-
factor model.  Panel D shows adjusted calendar time alphas for the Dictatorship portfolio.  Every month 
CTRL-Dictatorship portfolio returns are subtracted from Dictatorship portfolio returns and are regressed 
on a four-factor model.  All returns are monthly, value weighted and in excess of the return on a one 
month treasury bill.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent 
levels is indicated by *, **, and ***.    
 
Panel A:  Democracy Portfolio Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Democracy - CTRL-Democracy -0.15 2.49 -8.31 8.44 
  (t=-0.63)    
 (p=0.523)    
 
Panel B:  Dictatorship Portfolio Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dictatorship - CTRL-Dictatorship 0.24 2.19 -5.59 5.46 
 (t=1.18)    
 (p=0.241)    
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Table 3 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Democracy Portfolio Adjusted Calendar Time Regressions (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
  
Monthly Portfolio Returns alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
Democracy - CTRL-Democracy -0.03 0.01 -0.19** 0.08 -0.14** 
 (0.25) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) 
 
Panel D: Dictatorship Portfolio Adjusted Calendar Time Regressions (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
Dictatorship - CTRL-Dictatorship 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.08 
 (0.23) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) 
 
 
 
2.3.1.3 Return on a Zero Cost Strategy Using Control Firm Portfolios 
 
 Model misspecification appears to be a reason why past researchers have 
observed long-term abnormal returns for a strategy based on governance index values.  
If so, the governance strategy’s long-term abnormal returns should be generated from 
characteristics the chosen asset-pricing model cannot capture.  To further examine this, I 
regress a zero-cost portfolio comprised of control firm portfolios on the four-factor 
model and present the results in Table 4.  CTRL-Democracy and CTRL-Dictatorship 
firms should have similar governance index characteristics but may differ more on other 
dimensions.  The CTRL-Democracy minus CTRL-Dictatorship strategy produces a four-
factor model alpha of 0.83% a month with significance at the 5% level.  This translates 
into an annual abnormal return of 10% a year.  This is similar to the abnormal returns of 
8.5% per year measured in the same way for the strategy long on Democracies and short 
on Dictatorships.  This large and significant abnormal return for a strategy based on 
governance neutral portfolios suggests that returns to characteristics not fully captured 
by the four-factor model could explain the results observed by prior researchers.  
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Table 4 
Return on Zero Cost Control Firm Portfolio Strategy. 
 Firms are classified as Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios based on a governance index made 
of firm anti-takeover amendments and charter provisions from the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC).  A value of one is added to the index for each “manager friendly” charter provision a firm has.  
Democracies are defined as firms with 5 or fewer charter provisions.  Dictatorships are defined as firms 
with 14 or more charter provisions.  RMRF is the monthly value weighted return of the CRSP universe 
less the return on a one month treasury bill.  SMB is the return on small stocks minus the return on big 
stocks.  HML is the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks.  
SMB and HML are detailed in Fama and French (1993), pg. 9.  Momentum is the return on high past return 
stocks minus the return on low past return stocks.  Momentum is detailed in Carhart (1997), pg. 61.  alpha 
measures the abnormal returns to holding any portolio.  Portfolios are rebalanced in September 1990, July 
1993, July 1995, and February 1998 when the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) releases 
new data.   
 CTRL-Democracy and CTRL-Dictatorship portfolios are formed on size, book-to-market, and 
momentum.  Every month CTRL-Dictatorship portfolio returns are subtracted from CTRL-Democracy 
portfolio returns and are regressed on a factor model.  All returns are monthly, value weighted and in 
excess of the return on a one month treasury bill.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses and 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by *, **, and ***.            
 
CTRL-Democracy Portfolio minus CTRL-Dictatorship Portfolio Four-Factor Model Regressions 
(Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
CTRL-Democracy - CTRL-Dictatorship 0.83** -0.01 0.01 -0.49*** 0.20** 
 (0.33) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13) (0.08) 
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2.3.2 Robustness 
 
2.3.2.1 Extreme Governance Control Firm Portfolios 
 
 The results so far imply no long-term abnormal returns to a governance strategy 
after trying to mitigate misspecification in the asset-pricing model with control firm 
portfolios.  However, control firm portfolios may contain some near-Democracies and 
near-Dictatorships.  One could argue that near-Democracies and near-Dictatorships are 
generating returns similar to Democracies and Dictatorships since governance 
characteristics could be similar.  To account for this problem, I make sure control firm 
portfolios contain firms at least three governance index values removed from 
Democracies and Dictatorships.  From Panel A of Table 5, the CTRL2-Democracy has a 
minimum governance index value of 9 and an average governance index value of 11.1.  
The CTRL2-Dictatorship has a maximum governance index value of 10 and an average 
governance index value of 7.8.  The CTRL2-Dictatorship portfolio is now much closer 
to a Democracy portfolio compared to the previously defined CTRL-Dictatorship 
portfolio.  Likewise, the new control portfolio for the Democracy portfolio is much 
closer to a Dictatorship portfolio. 
 Intertemporal averages of adjusted Democracy and Dictatorship returns are 
insignificantly different from zero as seen in Panels B and C of Table 5.  Adjusted 
intercepts from four factor model regressions in Panels D and E are also insignificant 
statistically and economically.  The findings of no long-term abnormal returns for the 
governance portfolios shown in Table 3 are unlikely to be driven by near-Democracies 
and near-Dictatorships. 
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Table 5 
Extreme Control Portfolios: Adjusted Calendar Time Abnormal Returns. 
 Firms are classified as Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios based on a governance index made 
of firm anti-takeover amendments and charter provisions from the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC).  A value of one is added to the index for each “manager friendly” charter provision a firm has.  
Democracies are defined as firms with 5 or fewer charter provisions.  Dictatorships are defined as firms 
with 14 or more charter provisions.  RMRF is the monthly value weighted return of the CRSP universe 
less the return on a one month treasury bill.  SMB is the return on small stocks minus the return on big 
stocks.  HML is the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks.  
SMB and HML are detailed in Fama and French (1993), pg. 9.  Momentum is the return on high past return 
stocks minus the return on low past return stocks.  Momentum is detailed in Carhart (1997), pg. 61.  alpha 
measures the abnormal returns to holding any portolio.  Portfolios are rebalanced in September 1990, July 
1993, July 1995, and February 1998 when the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) releases 
new data.   
 CTRL2-Democracy and CTRL2-Dictatorship portfolios are formed on book-to-market, size, and 
momentum and are three G index values removed from Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios.  Panel A 
shows calendar time abnormal returns for the Democracy portfolio.  Expected returns obtained from the 
CTRL2-Democracy portfolio and are subtracted each month from Democracy portfolio returns to get 
abnormal returns.  Time series standard errors from the monthly abnormal returns are used to test for 
significance.  Panel B shows calendar time abnormal returns for the Dictatorship portfolio.  Abnormal 
returns are calculated and tested in a similar fashion to the Democracy portfolio.  Panel C shows the 
adjusted calendar time alpha for the Dictatorship portfolio.  Every month CTRL2-Democracy portfolio 
returns are subtracted from Democracy portfolio returns and are regressed on a four-factor model.  Panel 
D shows adjusted calendar time alphas for the Dictatorship portfolio.  Every month CTRL2-Dictatorship 
portfolio returns are subtracted from Dictatorship portfolio returns and are regressed on a four-factor 
model.  All returns are monthly, value weighted and in excess of the return on a one month treasury bill.  
Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by 
*, **, and ***.       
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of the Monthly Portfolio Governance Index (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Portfolio Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
     
Democracy 4.4 0.8 2 5 
     
CTRL2-Democracy 11.1 1.7 9 17 
     
Dictatorship 14.6 0.8 14 18 
     
CTRL2-Dictatorship 7.8 1.8 2 10 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  48   
Table 5 (Continued) 
 
Panel B:  Democracy Portfolio Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Democracy – CTRL2-Democracy -0.02 2.41 -7.67 6.87 
  (t=-0.09)    
 (p=0.924)    
 
Panel C:  Dictatorship Portfolio Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dictatorship – CTRL2-Dictatorship 0.13 2.44 -6.27 6.15 
 (t=0.58)    
 (p=0.560)    
 
 
Panel D: Democracy Portfolio Adjusted Calendar Time Regressions (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
  
Monthly Portfolio Returns alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
Democracy -  0.09 0.00 -0.07 -0.05 -0.12* 
CTRL2-Democracy (0.25) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) 
 
Panel E: Dictatorship Portfolio Adjusted Calendar Time Regressions (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
Dictatorship - -0.01 0.03 0.19** 0.27*** 0.13** 
CTRL2-Dictatorship (0.25) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) 
 
 
 
2.3.2.2 Alternative Matching Characteristics 
 
 Fama and French (1997) show that intercepts from the three-factor model are 
significant for some of the 48 portfolios formed on industry.  This means that industry 
generates a cross-sectional spread in returns not captured by asset pricing models.  
Matching on an industry dimension may control for any industry shocks generating 
long-term abnormal returns unrelated to governance.  In table 6, I find control firms 
based on industry, size and momentum.  With the industry-size-momentum formed 
control portfolios, I find no abnormal returns to governance portfolios. 
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Table 6 
Adjusted Calendar Time Abnormal Returns: Matching on Size, Industry and Momentum. 
 Firms are classified as Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios based on a governance index made 
of firm anti-takeover amendments and charter provisions from the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC).  A value of one is added to the index for each “manager friendly” charter provision a firm has.  
Democracies are defined as firms with 5 or fewer charter provisions.  Dictatorships are defined as firms 
with 14 or more charter provisions.  RMRF is the monthly value weighted return of the CRSP universe 
less the return on a one month treasury bill.  SMB is the return on small stocks minus the return on big 
stocks.  HML is the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks.  
SMB and HML are detailed in Fama and French (1993), pg. 9.  Momentum is the return on high past return 
stocks minus the return on low past return stocks.  Momentum is detailed in Carhart (1997), pg. 61.  alpha 
measures the abnormal returns to holding any portolio.  Portfolios are rebalanced in September 1990, July 
1993, July 1995, and February 1998 when the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) releases 
new data.   
 To create a control firm portfolio for the Democracy portfolio, all IRRC firms with a governance 
index value greater than 5 are used.  To create a control firm portfolio for the Dictatorship portfolio, all 
IRRC firms with a governance index value less than 14 are used.  In September 1990, July 1993, July 
1995, and February 1998 firms are found that match the Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios on the 
basis of size, industry and momentum.  To find matching firms, all non-Democracy firms in the IRRC 
universe within 80% to 120% of a Democracy firm’s momentum are kept.  The firms within the same 
industry and finally firms with the closest size are kept.  A Non-Dictatorship portfolio is formed in a 
similar fashion to the Non-Democracy portfolio.  Panel A shows calendar time abnormal returns for the 
Democracy portfolio.  Expected returns are obtained from the Non-Democracy portfolio and are 
subtracted each month from Democracy portfolio returns to get abnormal returns.  Time series standard 
errors from the monthly abnormal returns are used to test for significance.  Panel B shows calendar time 
abnormal returns for the Dictatorship portfolio.  Abnormal returns are calculated and tested in a similar 
fashion to the Democracy portfolio.  Panel C shows the adjusted calendar time alpha for the Dictatorship 
portfolio.  Every month Non-Democracy portfolio returns are subtracted from Democracy portfolio returns 
and are regressed on a four-factor model.  Panel D shows adjusted calendar time alphas for the 
Dictatorship portfolio.  Every month Non-Dictatorship portfolio returns are subtracted from Dictatorship 
portfolio returns and are regressed on a four-factor model.  All returns are monthly, value weighted and in 
excess of the return on a one month treasury bill.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses and 
significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels is indicated by * and **.            
 
Panel A:  Democracy Portfolio Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
Democracy - Non-Democracy -0.10 1.96 -6.05 3.94 
  (t=-0.52)    
 (p=0.599)    
 
Panel B:  Dictatorship Portfolio Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
Dictatorship - Non-Dictatorship -0.20 2.07 -6.95 5.95 
  (t=-1.01)    
 (p=0.309)    
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Table 6 
 
Panel C: Democracy Portfolio Adjusted Calendar Time Regressions (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
  
Monthly Portfolio Returns alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
Democracy - Non-Democracy -0.02 0.07 -0.23** -0.13 -0.19** 
 (0.19) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) 
 
Panel D: Dictatorship Portfolio Adjusted Calendar Time Regressions (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
Dictatorship – Non-Dictatorship -0.10 -0.02 -0.08 0.05 -0.08 
 (0.21) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) 
 
 
 
2.3.2.3 Wal-Mart and the Large Market Value, Low Book-to-Market Portfolio 
 
 Fama and French (1993) in Table 9a and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) in Table 7 
show that a portfolio of firms in the largest size quintile and lowest book-to-market 
quintile has positive and significant intercepts from regressions on the Fama-French 
three-factor model.  Wal-Mart is the largest firm in the Democracy portfolio and it also 
lies in the lowest book-to-market quintile in the sample of IRRC firms.  Large size and 
low book-to-market is a combination of dimensions the model has difficulty explaining.  
I remove Wal-Mart from the Democracy portfolio in Table 7.  After removing Wal-
Mart, Democracy portfolio returns have insignificant intercepts when regressed on a 
four-factor model.   
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Table 7 
Effect of Dropping Wal-Mart on Democracy Portfolio. 
 Firms are classified as Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios based on a governance index made 
of firm anti-takeover amendments and charter provisions from the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC).  A value of one is added to the index for each “manager friendly” charter provision a firm has.  
Democracies are defined as firms with 5 or fewer charter provisions.  Dictatorships are defined as firms 
with 14 or more charter provisions.  RMRF is the monthly value weighted return of the CRSP universe 
less the return on a one month treasury bill.  SMB is the return on small stocks minus the return on big 
stocks.  HML is the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks.  
SMB and HML are detailed in Fama and French (1993), pg. 9.  Momentum is the return on high past return 
stocks minus the return on low past return stocks.  Momentum is detailed in Carhart (1997), pg. 61.  alpha 
measures the abnormal returns to holding any portolio.  Portfolios are rebalanced in September 1990, July 
1993, July 1995, and February 1998 when the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) releases 
new data.   
 Panel A shows value weighted monthly regressions of the Democracy portfolio on the Fama-
French Carhart four factor model.  Panel B shows Democracy portfolio regressions on factor models that 
exclude Wal-Mart from the Democracy portfolio.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses and 
significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels is indicated by * and ** respectively.   
 
Panel A: Democracy Portfolio Calendar Time Regressions (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Portfolio alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
Democracy 0.30* 0.99** -0.24** -0.21** -0.06 
 (0.14) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
 
Panel B: Democracy Portfolio Calendar Time Regressions without Wal-Mart (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 
1999) 
 
Portfolio alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
Democracy without Wal-Mart 0.21 1.01** -0.19** -0.10 -0.07 
 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.04 
 
 
 
2.3.2.4 Portfolios Matched on Book-to-Market 
 
 Finally, forming control portfolios on book-to-market alone results in 
insignificant adjusted intercepts and calendar time abnormal returns.  The results from 
Table 8 are consistent with returns for book-to-market characteristics that are difficult 
for asset pricing models to explain.   
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Table 8 
Adjusted Calendar Time Abnormal Returns: Book-to-Market Matching. 
 Firms are classified as Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios based on a governance index made 
of firm anti-takeover amendments and charter provisions from the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC).  A value of one is added to the index for each “manager friendly” charter provision a firm has.  
Democracies are defined as firms with 5 or fewer charter provisions.  Dictatorships are defined as firms 
with 14 or more charter provisions.  RMRF is the monthly value weighted return of the CRSP universe 
less the return on a one month treasury bill.  SMB is the return on small stocks minus the return on big 
stocks.  HML is the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks.  
SMB and HML are detailed in Fama and French (1993), pg. 9.  Momentum is the return on high past return 
stocks minus the return on low past return stocks.  Momentum is detailed in Carhart (1997), pg. 61.  alpha 
measures the abnormal returns to holding any portolio.  Portfolios are rebalanced in September 1990, July 
1993, July 1995, and February 1998 when the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) releases 
new data.   
 CTRL-Democracy and CTRL-Dictatorship portfolios are formed on book-to-market matching 
alone.  Panel A shows calendar time abnormal returns for the Democracy portfolio.  Expected returns 
obtained from the CTRL-Democracy portfolio and are subtracted each month from Democracy portfolio 
returns to get abnormal returns.  Time series standard errors from the monthly abnormal returns are used to 
test for significance.  Panel B shows calendar time abnormal returns for the Dictatorship portfolio.  
Abnormal returns are calculated and tested in a similar fashion to the Democracy portfolio.  Panel C shows 
the adjusted calendar time alpha for the Dictatorship portfolio.  Every month CTRL-Democracy portfolio 
returns are subtracted from Democracy portfolio returns and are regressed on a four-factor model.  Panel 
D shows adjusted calendar time alphas for the Dictatorship portfolio.  Every month CTRL-Dictatorship 
portfolio returns are subtracted from Dictatorship portfolio returns and are regressed on a four-factor 
model.  All returns are monthly, value weighted and in excess of the return on a one month treasury bill.  
Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels is 
indicated by * and **.            
 
Panel A:  Democracy Portfolio Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Democracy - CTRL-Democracy 0.22 1.91 -4.11 6.12 
 
(t=1.24) 
   
 
(p=0.217) 
   
 
Panel B:  Dictatorship Portfolio Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dictatorship - CTRL-Dictatorship -0.19 2.34 -6.61 8.95 
 
 (t=-0.84) 
   
 
(p=0.398) 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Democracy Portfolio Adjusted Calendar Time Regressions (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
  
Monthly Portfolio Returns alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
Democracy - CTRL-Democracy 0.29 0.00 -0.13 -0.16* -0.08 
 
(0.20) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) 
 
Panel D: Dictatorship Portfolio Adjusted Calendar Time Regressions (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
Dictatorship - CTRL-Dictatorship -0.23 0.09 0.21** 0.18 -0.06 
 
(0.23) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) 
 
 
 
2.3.2.5 Entrenchment Index 
 
 Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) argue that only a few anti-takeover 
amendments matter.  The existence or absence of six provisions (including staggered 
boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for 
mergers, supermajority requirements for charter amendments, golden parachutes, and 
poison pills) makes up an entrenchment index.  In Table 9, I replicate the results from 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell.  A portfolio long in the firms with the lowest entrenchment 
index (entrenchment index=0) and short in the firms with the highest entrenchment 
index (entrenchment index=5or6) earns abnormal returns of an astonishing 14% a year.  
The portfolio made up of firms with an entrenchment index equal to zero is referred to as 
the DemocracyBCF portfolio. The portfolio made up of firms with an entrenchment 
index equal to five or six is referred to as the DictatorshipBCF portfolio.  Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell also find Tobin’s Q is increasing for lower values of the 
entrenchment index.   
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Table 9 
In Sample Replication of Calendar Time Regressions from Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004). 
 This table replicates the returns to a strategy based on an entrenchment index calculated from 
anti-takeover amendments and charter provisions listed in publications by the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC) and detailed in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004).  The DemocracyBCF 
portfolio (Entrenchment Index=0), the DictatorshipBCF portfolio (Entrenchment Index=5or6), and a 
hedge portfolio long in the DemocracyBCF portfolio and short in the Dictatorship portfolio are regressed 
on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model.  DemocracyBCF and DictatorshipBCF portfolios are in excess of 
the return on a one month treasury bill.  RMRF is the monthly value weighted return of the CRSP universe 
less the return on a one month treasury bill.  SMB is the return on small stocks minus the return on big 
stocks.  HML is the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks.  
SMB and HML are detailed in Fama and French (1993), pg. 9.  Momentum is the return on high past return 
stocks minus the return on low past return stocks.  Momentum is detailed in Carhart (1997), pg. 61.  alpha 
measures the abnormal returns to holding any portolio.  Portfolios are rebalanced in September 1990, July 
1993, July 1995, and February 1998 when the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) releases 
new data.  Panel A shows the original results in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004).  Panel B replicates 
their results.  All returns are monthly and value weighted.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses and 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by *, **, and ***. 
 
Panel A: Original results by BCF, table XI (Sept. 1990 – Dec. 1999) 
 
Governance Portfolio alpha 
DemocracyBCF-DictatorshipBCF 1.16*** 
 (0.284) 
 
Panel B: Replication of BCF results on Four-Factor Model (Sept. 1990 – Dec. 1999) 
 
Governance Portfolio alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
DemocracyBCF-DictatorshipBCF 1.20*** -0.18** -0.33*** -0.59*** -0.11 
 (0.271) (0.077) (0.094) (0.108) (0.069) 
      
DemocracyBCF 0.50*** 0.95*** -0.33*** -0.27*** -0.08** 
 (0.120) (0.034) (0.041) (0.048) (0.031) 
      
DictatorshipBCF -0.70*** 1.12*** 0.00 0.31*** 0.03 
 (0.210) (0.060) (0.073) (0.084) (0.054) 
 
 
 
 Since the information about the entrenchment index is publicly available, the 
large abnormal returns to a strategy based on the entrenchment index information are at 
odds with efficient markets.  Known characteristics related to the cross-section of stock 
returns could explain the returns to a strategy based on the governance index in 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).  Since the entrenchment index used by Bebchuk, 
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Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) is also public information, the returns to the entrenchment 
index strategy are explored similarly.  The CTRL-DemocracyBCF portfolio is composed 
of firms with an entrenchment index greater than zero.  CTRL-DemocracyBCF firms 
match DemocracyBCF firms on past 11 month momentum.  The CTRL-Dictatorship 
portfolio is composed of firms with an entrenchment index less than five that match 
DictatorshipBCF firms on book-to-market.   
 Table 10 shows the returns for the entrenchment index strategy after control firm 
portfolio adjustments.  In panel A, calendar time abnormal returns for the 
DictatorshipBCF portfolio are negative but insignificant.  Panel B shows positive but 
near zero returns for the DictatorshipBCF portfolio.  The results from the adjusted 
calendar time regressions are similar.  Panels C and D show insignificant and near zero 
abnormal returns for the DemocracyBCF and DictatorshipBCF portfolios.  Past 
researchers may have detected abnormal returns to governance based index strategies 
because the characteristics of firms with better governance were highly correlated with 
the characteristics of firms that did well in the 1990s.  Likewise, firms with poor 
governance may have characteristics other than governance highly correlated with firms 
that did poorly during the 1990s.        
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Table 10 
Adjusted Calendar Time Abnormal Returns for Entrenchment Index Portfolios. 
 An entrenchment index is calculated from anti-takeover amendments and charter provisions listed 
in publications by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and detailed in Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and Ferrell (2004).  The DemocracyBCF portfolio (Entrenchment Index=0) and the DictatorshipBCF 
portfolio (Entrenchment Index=5or6) are regressed on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model.  RMRF is the 
monthly value weighted return of the CRSP universe less the return on a one month treasury bill.  SMB is 
the return on small stocks minus the return on big stocks.  HML is the return on high book-to-market 
stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks.  SMB and HML are detailed in Fama and French 
(1993), pg. 9.  Momentum is the return on high past return stocks minus the return on low past return 
stocks.  Momentum is detailed in Carhart (1997), pg. 61.  alpha measures the abnormal returns to holding 
any portolio.  Portfolios are rebalanced in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, and February 1998 when 
the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) releases new data.   
 CTRL-DemocracyBCF firms have an entrenchment index greater than 0 and are matched to 
DemocracyBCF (Entrenchment Index=0) firms on past 11 month momentum in September 1990, July 
1993, July 1995, and February 1998.  CTRL-DictatorshipBCF firms have an entrenchment index less than 
5 and are matched to DictatorshipBCF (Entrenchment Index=5or6) firms on book-to-market in September 
1990, July 1993, July 1995, and February 1998.  Panel A shows calendar time abnormal returns for the 
DemocracyBCF portfolio.  Expected returns are obtained from the CTRL- DemocracyBCF portfolio and 
are subtracted each month from DemocracyBCF portfolio returns to get abnormal returns.  Time series 
standard errors from the monthly abnormal returns are used to test for significance.  Panel B shows 
calendar time abnormal returns for the DictatorshipBCF portfolio.  Abnormal returns are calculated and 
tested in a similar fashion to the DemocracyBCF portfolio.  Panel C shows the adjusted calendar time 
alpha for the DictatorshipBCF portfolio.  Every month CTRL-DemocracyBCF portfolio returns are 
subtracted from DemocracyBCF portfolio returns and are regressed on a four-factor model.  Panel D 
shows adjusted calendar time alphas for the DictatorshipBCF portfolio.  Every month CTRL-
DictatorshipBCF portfolio returns are subtracted from DictatorshipBCF portfolio returns and are regressed 
on a four-factor model.  All returns are monthly, value weighted and in excess of the return on a one 
month treasury bill.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent 
levels is indicated by *, **, and ***. 
 
Panel A:  DemocracyBCF Portfolio Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
DemocracyBCF – CTRL-DemocracyBCF -0.44 6.97 -28.72 28.88 
 (t=-0.66)    
 (p=0.506)    
 
Panel B:  DictatorshipBCF Portfolio Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
DictatorshipBCF – CTRL-DictatorshipBCF 0.08 2.51 -7.23 7.58 
 
(t=0.34) 
   
 
(p=0.736) 
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Table 10 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: DemocracyBCF Portfolio Adjusted Calendar Time Regressions (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
  
Monthly Portfolio Returns alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
DemocracyBCF - CTRL-DemocracyBCF -0.11 -0.36* 0.47* 0.26 0.14 
 (0.71) (0.20) (0.24) (0.28) (0.18) 
 
Panel D: DictatorshipBCF Portfolio Adjusted Calendar Time Regressions (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
DictatorshipBCF - CTRL-DictatorshipBCF 0.18 -0.14* -0.03 -0.16 0.06 
 
(0.26) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) 
 
 
 
 If near-Democracies and near-Dictatorships are included in control portfolios, the 
control portfolios may be contaminated.  In Table XI of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 
(2004) long portfolios include firms with an entrenchment index as high as two.  Short 
portfolios include firms with an entrenchment index as low as three.  With this in mind, I 
construct the CTRL2-DemocracyBCF portfolio in Table 11 with firms that have an 
entrenchment index greater than two.  The CTRL2-Dictatorship portfolio is constructed 
with firms than have an entrenchment index less than three.  The results are similar to 
Table 10.  Near-Democracies and near-Dictatorships in the control firm portfolios do not 
seem to be affecting the results.     
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Table 11 
Extreme Control Portfolios: Adjusted Calendar Time Abnormal Returns  
for Entrenchment Index Portfolios. 
 An entrenchment index is calculated from anti-takeover amendments and charter provisions listed 
in publications by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and detailed in Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and Ferrell (2004).  The DemocracyBCF portfolio (Entrenchment Index=0) and the DictatorshipBCF 
portfolio (Entrenchment Index=5or6) are regressed on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model.  RMRF is the 
monthly value weighted return of the CRSP universe less the return on a one month treasury bill.  SMB is 
the return on small stocks minus the return on big stocks.  HML is the return on high book-to-market 
stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks.  SMB and HML are detailed in Fama and French 
(1993), pg. 9.  Momentum is the return on high past return stocks minus the return on low past return 
stocks.  Momentum is detailed in Carhart (1997), pg. 61.  alpha measures the abnormal returns to holding 
any portolio.  Portfolios are rebalanced in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, and February 1998 when 
the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) releases new data.   
 CTRL2-DemocracyBCF and CTRL2-DictatorshipBCF are two entrenchment index values 
removed from DemocracyBCF and DictatorshipBCF portfolios.  CTRL2-DemocracyBCF firms are 
matched to Democracy BCF firms on past 11 month momentum.  CTRL2-DictatorshipBCF firms are 
matched to DictatorshipBCF firms on book-to-market.  Panel A shows descriptive statistics of the 
entrenchment index for all portfolios.  Panel B shows calendar time abnormal returns for the 
DemocracyBCF portfolio.  Expected returns are obtained from the CTRL2-DemocracyBCF portfolio and 
are subtracted each month from DemocracyBCF portfolio returns to get abnormal returns.  Time series 
standard errors from the monthly abnormal returns are used to test for significance.  Panel C shows 
calendar time abnormal returns for the DictatorshipBCF portfolio.  Abnormal returns are calculated and 
tested in a similar fashion to the DemocracyBCF portfolio.  Panel D shows the adjusted calendar time 
alpha for the DictatorshipBCF portfolio.  Every month CTRL2-DemocracyBCF portfolio returns are 
subtracted from DemocracyBCF portfolio returns and are regressed on a four-factor model.  Panel E 
shows adjusted calendar time alphas for the DictatorshipBCF portfolio.  Every month CTRL2-
DictatorshipBCF portfolio returns are subtracted from DictatorshipBCF portfolio returns and are regressed 
on a four-factor model.  All returns are monthly, value weighted and in excess of the return on a one 
month treasury bill.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent 
levels is indicated by *, **, and ***.       
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of the Entrenchment Index for all Portfolios (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
Portfolio Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
     
DemocracyBCF 0 0 0 0 
     
CTRL2-DemocracyBCF 3.5 0.7 3 6 
     
DictatorshipBCF 5.1 0.3 5 6 
     
CTRL2-DictatorshipBCF 1.3 0.8 0 2 
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Table 11 (Continued) 
 
Panel B:  DemocracyBCF Portfolio Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
DemocracyBCF - CTRL2-DemocracyBCF -0.44 6.99 -28.72 28.88 
  (t=-0.65)    
 (p=0.511)    
 
Panel C:  DictatorshipBCF Portfolio Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
DictatorshipBCF - CTRL2-DictatorshipBCF -0.11 2.82 -6.16 8.64 
 
 (t=-0.41) 
   
 
(p=0.678) 
   
 
Panel D: DemocracyBCF Portfolio Adjusted Calendar Time Regressions (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
DemocracyBCF - CTRL2-DemocracyBCF -0.04 -0.40* 0.41* 0.13 0.12 
 (0.71) (0.20) (0.25) (0.29) (0.18) 
 
Panel E: DictatorshipBCF Portfolio Adjusted Calendar Time Regressions (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
DictatorshipBCF - CTRL2-DictatorshipBCF 0.07 -0.19** -0.10 -0.24** 0.03 
 
(0.29) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.07) 
 
 
 
 After controlling for momentum or book-to-market, an entrenchment index 
strategy does not have long run abnormal returns.  Entrenchment index portfolios built 
by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) appear to have characteristics highly correlated 
with the characteristics of other portfolios that have abnormal returns.  If this is the case, 
a trading strategy based on characteristics similar to entrenchment index portfolios 
should generate similar abnormal returns as measured by the four-factor model.  In 
Table 12, returns to the control portfolios constructed in Table 10 are examined.  
Monthly returns to the CTRL-DictatorshipBCF portfolio are subtracted from monthly 
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returns to the CTRL-DemocracyBCF portfolio and regressed on the four factor model.  
This zero cost portfolio generates abnormal returns of 1.5 percent a month, translating 
into large abnormal returns of 18 on an annual basis.  Characteristics other than 
governance correlated with abnormal returns appear to be a reason past research has 
detected abnormal returns for entrenchment index strategies.  Portfolios with similar 
characteristics to entrenchment index portfolio other than governance generate similar 
returns.        
 
 
Table 12 
Return on Zero Cost Entrenchment Index Based Control Firm Portfolio Strategy. 
 An entrenchment index is calculated from anti-takeover amendments and charter provisions listed 
in publications by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and detailed in Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and Ferrell (2004).  The DemocracyBCF portfolio (Entrenchment Index=0) and the DictatorshipBCF 
portfolio (Entrenchment Index=5or6) are regressed on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model.  RMRF is the 
monthly value weighted return of the CRSP universe less the return on a one month treasury bill.  SMB is 
the return on small stocks minus the return on big stocks.  HML is the return on high book-to-market 
stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks.  SMB and HML are detailed in Fama and French 
(1993), pg. 9.  Momentum is the return on high past return stocks minus the return on low past return 
stocks.  Momentum is detailed in Carhart (1997), pg. 61.  alpha measures the abnormal returns to holding 
any portolio.  Portfolios are rebalanced in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, and February 1998 when 
the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) releases new data.   
 CTRL-DemocracyBCF firms have an entrenchment index greater than 0 and are matched to 
DemocracyBCF (Entrenchment Index=0) firms on past 11 month momentum in September 1990, July 
1993, July 1995, and February 1998.  CTRL-DictatorshipBCF firms have an entrenchment index less than 
5 and are matched to DictatorshipBCF (Entrenchment Index=5or6) firms on book-to-market in September 
1990, July 1993, July 1995, and February 1998.  Every month CTRL-DictatorshipBCF portfolio returns 
are subtracted from CTRL-DemocracyBCF portfolio returns and are regressed on a four-factor model.  All 
returns are monthly, value weighted and in excess of the return on a one month treasury bill.  Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses and significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels is indicated by *, **, and 
***. 
 
CTRL-DemocracyBCF Portfolio minus CTRL-DictatorshipBCF Portfolio Four-Factor Model 
Regressions (Sep. 1990 to Dec. 1999) 
 
Monthly Portfolio Returns alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
CTRL-DemocracyBCF - 1.50** 0.09 -0.81*** -0.99*** -0.19 
CTRL-DictatorshipBCF (0.72) (0.21) (0.25) (0.29) (0.18) 
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2.3.3 The Learning Hypothesis 
 
 The evidence I have presented supports model misspecification as a reason past 
researchers have detected abnormal returns for strategies based on governance index 
values.  A different explanation is posed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).  They 
suggest that investors did not expect the high agency costs of firms with many anti-
takeover amendments.  As a consequence, investors had to learn about the value 
destroying effects of many anti-takeover amendments.  In table 13, I show subperiod 
results for the governance index strategy in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).  The 
sample is divided in half on April 30, 1995.  Table 13 is taken from Table VII in 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).  If investors were learning about the valuation 
effects of governance, long-run abnormal returns would decrease over time.  Investors 
would respond with increasing quickness to information about corporate governance.  
Instead of decreasing long-run abnormal returns over time, the long-run abnormal 
returns to the governance strategy are larger for the second half of the 1990s.  
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Table 13 
Subperiod Results from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). 
 Firms are classified as Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios based on a governance index made 
of firm anti-takeover amendments and charter provisions from the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC).  A value of one is added to the index for each “manager friendly” charter provision a firm has.  
Democracies are defined as firms with 5 or fewer charter provisions.  Dictatorships are defined as firms 
with 14 or more charter provisions.  This table replicates the returns to a strategy based on a governance 
index calculated from anti-takeover amendments and charter provisions listed in publications by the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and detailed in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).  The 
Democracy portfolio ( )5≤G , the Dictatorship portfolio ( )14≥G , and a hedge portfolio long in the 
Democracy portfolio and short in the Dictatorship portfolio are regressed on the Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model.  Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios are in excess of the return on a one month treasury bill.  
RMRF is the monthly value weighted return of the CRSP universe less the return on a one month treasury 
bill.  SMB is the return on small stocks minus the return on big stocks.  HML is the return on high book-to-
market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks.  SMB and HML are detailed in Fama and 
French (1993), pg. 9.  Momentum is the return on high past return stocks minus the return on low past 
return stocks.  Momentum is detailed in Carhart (1997), pg. 61.  alpha measures the abnormal returns to 
holding any portolio.  Portfolios are rebalanced in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, and February 
1998 when the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) releases new data.   
 Panel A shows the alpha or intercept for the first half of the sample from value weighted monthly 
regressions of the Democracy minus Dictatorship portfolio on the Fama-French Carhart four factor model.  
Panel B shows the alpha from the second half of the sample.  Both panels are from Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) Table VII.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance at the five-percent 
and one-percent levels is indicated by * and ** respectively.   
 
Panel A: First half of sample by GIM, table VII (Sept. 1990 – April 1995) 
 
Governance Portfolio alpha 
GIM Democracy-Dictatorship 0.45 
 (0.23) 
 
Panel B: Second half of sample by GIM, table VII (April 1995 – Dec. 1999) 
 
Governance Portfolio alpha 
GIM Democracy-Dictatorship 0.75 
 (0.40) 
 
 
 
 I also investigate the raw returns of the governance strategy.  In Figure 1, I show 
the growth of $100 invested in the governance strategy of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003).  Similar to the abnormal return results, most of the strategy’s profitability comes 
late in the sample period.   
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Figure 1 
Growth of $100 Over Time Invested in the Governance Strategy. 
 Firms are classified as Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios based on a governance index made 
of firm anti-takeover amendments and charter provisions from the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC).  A value of one is added to the index for each “manager friendly” charter provision a firm has.  
Democracies are defined as firms with 5 or fewer charter provisions.  Dictatorships are defined as firms 
with 14 or more charter provisions.  This figure shows the growth of $100 over the period of the 1990s 
invested in a hedge portfolio long in the Democracy portfolio and short in the Dictatorship portfolio. 
 
 
 Since returns to the governance strategy are stronger in the second half of the 
sample period (both raw and four-factor model adjusted), investors may have taken ten 
years to learn about the value destroying effects of many anti-takeover provisions.  
Theories of investor learning may be difficult to reconcile with the abnormal returns to 
the governance index strategy.  Brav and Heaton (2002) show that learning is with 
respect to changes in valuation-relevant parameters.  Parameter uncertainty from 
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changes in the dividend process generates predictability in Lewellen and Shanken’s 
(2002) model of investor learning.  Theories of investor learning are silent about long 
term abnormal returns from learning with respect to levels like the governance index.  If 
a pre-1990 shock to the corporate governance environment was the valuation relevant 
change, then learning must have taken ten years.  Compared to the return momentum 
phenomenon (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993) that many rational learning theories were 
designed to explain, ten years is rather long. 
2.4 Notes 
 
1. http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~metrick/data.htm. 
2. For more information on the construction of the HML, SMB, and Momentum factors 
see Fama and French (1993 page 9) and Carhart (1997 footnote on page 61). 
3. http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
4. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) report a mean Governance Index of 9.0 for 1990, 
9.3 for 1993, 9.4 for 1995 and 8.9 for 1998.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
CONTEMPORANEOUS MARKET REACTIONS TO CHANGES IN  
 
GOVERNANCE LEVELS 
 
 In an efficient market, information about governance should be reflected in the 
value of the firm.  No long-term abnormal returns to strategies based on a governance 
index should exist.  Finding no long-term abnormal returns to governance does not mean 
that governance “does not matter.”  Governance may affect firm value, but information 
about governance should be impounded into security prices at the time governance 
information is released.  To examine the effect of governance on firm value, I look at 
contemporaneous market reactions to changes in governance index levels. 
 Adding anti-takeover amendments might entrench corporate managers. If so, a 
large addition of anti-takeover amendments should be accompanied by an abnormal 
reduction in the value of the firm.  Conversely, a large reduction in anti-takeover 
amendments should expose corporate managers to takeover market discipline and 
improve firm value.  To measure the valuation effects of changes in the number of anti-
takeover amendments, I look at stock returns over the time period contemporaneous with 
a change in the number of anti-takeover amendments.  Panel A of Table 14 shows the 
number of firm changes in governance index levels over the period of 1990 to 2002.  As 
can be seen from the table, changes in the governance index do not happen often.  
Because the governance index level changes infrequently for most firms, Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003) do not use a panel data fixed effects approach for studying the effect 
of governance on firm value.  When governance index level changes for a firm, it is not 
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drastic.  Firms are adding or subtracting few anti-takeover amendments over the sample 
period.  Some firms do add as many as ten and subtract as many as eight amendments.   
 I examine the large changes in anti-takeover amendments since the construction 
of the governance index implies that large changes should have the most impact on 
shareholder rights.  In Panel B of Table 14, portfolios are formed by the number of 
increases or decreases in the governance index over the span of two consecutive Investor 
Responsibility Research Center publications.  Portfolio returns are regressed on the four 
Fama-French-Carhart factors during the period contemporaneous with the change in the 
governance index.  Panel B shows that contemporaneous unadjusted abnormal returns 
are always greater for moves towards “worse” governance (or for index increases).    
 Panel C of Table 14 shows the unadjusted abnormal returns of portfolios ranked 
by scaled changes in the governance index.  Governance index changes are scaled since 
moves towards “worse” governance may be more meaningful for firms that are already 
more shareholder friendly.  Observations between consecutive IRRC publication 
releases are first grouped as increases or decreases in the governance index.  Changes in 
the governance index are ranked into quintiles within each grouping after scaling by the 
average governance index level between adjacent IRRC publications.  The Liberate 
portfolio includes the quintile of firms with the greatest scaled decrease in the 
governance index.  The Lock-Up portfolio includes the quintile of firms with the greatest 
scaled increase in the governance index.  As with portfolios built on changes in the 
governance index that are not scaled, contemporaneous unadjusted abnormal returns are 
greater for moves towards “worse” governance as seen by Liberate and Lock-Up 
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portfolio alphas.  The Liberate portfolio has an insignificant alpha of .02 while the Lock-
Up portfolio has a statistically significant alpha of .52.     
 
 
Table 14 
Portfolios Formed on Large Changes in the Governance Index. 
 Changes in the governance index are calculated every time new IRRC data is released (July 1993, 
July 1995, February 1998, November 1999 (for 2000 publication) and January 2002).  Panel A shows 
descriptive statistics for changes in the governance index from September 1990 through January 2002.  
Panel B shows regressions of portfolios formed by governance index changes on a four factor model.  
Panel B shows regressions on the factor model contemporaneous with the change in the governance index.  
In Panel C, changes in the governance index are scaled by the average governance index value for adjacent 
IRRC publications.  Firms are ranked by quintiles each publication year within the sample of negative or 
positive scaled changes in the governance index.  The Liberate portfolio includes the quintile of firms with 
the largest scaled decrease in the governance index.  The Lock-Up portfolio includes the quintile of firms 
with the largest scaled increase in the governance index.  RMRF is the monthly value weighted return of 
the CRSP universe less the return on a one month treasury bill.  SMB is the return on small stocks minus 
the return on big stocks.  HML is the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-
to-market stocks.  SMB and HML are detailed in Fama and French (1993), pg. 9.  Momentum is the return 
on high past return stocks minus the return on low past return stocks.  Momentum is detailed in Carhart 
(1997), pg. 61.  alpha measures the abnormal returns to holding any portolio.  All returns are monthly, 
value weighted, and in excess of the return on a one month treasury bill.  Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses and significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels is indicated by * and ** 
respectively.   
 
Panel A:  Changes in the governance index (Sep. 1990 to January 2002) 
 
Change in the G Index Frequency Percent 
-8 2 0.03 
-7 4 0.06 
-6 1 0.02 
-5 5 0.08 
-4 5 0.08 
-3 16 0.26 
-2 62 0.99 
-1 528 8.45 
0 3610 57.77 
1 1435 22.96 
2 386 6.18 
3 116 1.86 
4 35 0.56 
5 26 0.42 
6 7 0.11 
7 7 0.11 
8 2 0.03 
10 2 0.03 
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Table 14 (Continued) 
 
Panel B:  Portfolio returns contemporaneous with changes in the governance index 
 
Portfolio alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
Decrease G by 5 or more 0.24 0.88** -0.05 0.30 -0.04 
 (0.66) (0.18) (0.18) (0.23) (0.10) 
      
Decrease G by less than 5 0.10** 0.99** -0.15** 0.03** -0.01 
Increase G by less than 5 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Increase G by 5 or more 1.32* 0.85** 0.60** -0.29 0.14 
 (0.59) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.09) 
      
Decrease G by 4 or more 0.20 1.02** -0.01 0.38 -0.02 
 (0.60) (0.17) (0.16) (0.21) (0.09) 
      
Decrease G by less than 4 0.10* 0.98** -0.14** 0.03* -0.01 
Increase G by less than 4 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Increase G by 4 or more 0.98 1.22** -0.10 -0.62** 0.20* 
 (0.67) (0.19) (0.18) (0.23) (0.10) 
      
Decrease G by 3 or more 0.48 0.97** -0.24 0.22 -0.08 
 (0.45) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.07) 
      
Decrease G by less than 3 0.09* 0.98** -0.14** 0.04* 0.00 
Increase G by less than 3 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
      
Increase G by 3 or more 0.54 1.10** 0.12 -0.36** 0.04 
 (0.33) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.05) 
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Table 14 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Portfolios formed on scaled changes in the governance index 
 
Portfolio alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
Liberate 0.02 1.04** -0.25** -0.21* -0.11* 
 (0.29) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.04) 
      
-4 0.10 1.00** -0.15 0.20 0.02 
 (0.30) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.04) 
      
-3 0.00 0.80** 0.03 0.38** 0.00 
 (0.33) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.05) 
      
-2 -0.41 1.07** -0.17* 0.39** 0.06 
 (0.25) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) 
      
-1 -0.07 1.13** -0.29** 0.53** -0.07 
 (0.32) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.05) 
      
No Change 0.18** 0.97** -0.17** 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
      
1 -0.34* 0.94** 0.01 0.53** 0.05 
 (0.16) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) 
      
2 0.13 0.92** -0.17** 0.13 0.02 
 (0.22) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) 
      
3 -0.29 1.14** 0.08 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.26) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) 
      
4 0.20 1.05** -0.04 0.20** 0.05 
 (0.19) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) 
      
Lock-Up 0.52* 0.92** -0.05 -0.20 -0.01 
 (0.23) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) 
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 An improvement in firm value when more anti-takeover amendments are added 
seems counter to an increase in the governance index being entrenching.  Since the 
market responds positively to the addition of anti-takeover amendments, more anti-
takeover amendments may enhance value by providing negotiating leverage in the 
bidding process, protection of corporate culture, or some other benefit.  Before exploring 
a number of the interpretations that the evidence lends itself to, I look at alternatively 
defined governance indices and control firm adjusted pricing models.  In Table 15, I run 
a similar analysis with the entrenchment index as defined in Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2004).  Panel A of Table 15 shows that the entrenchment index changes less 
often for firms than the governance index.  Since the maximum change and value for the 
entrenchment index is smaller than the maximum change and value for the governance 
index, I form portfolios in Panel B of Table 15 based on smaller changes.  Results for the 
entrenchment index are similar to the results for the governance index.  
Contemporaneous unadjusted abnormal returns are always greater for moves towards 
worse governance (entrenchment index increases).  In Panel C, contemporaneous returns 
for the Lock-UpBCF portfolio are statistically significant and greater than returns for the 
LiberateBCF portfolio.    
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Table 15 
Portfolios Formed on Large Changes in the Entrenchment Index. 
 Changes in the entrenchment index are calculated every time new IRRC data is released (July 
1993, July 1995, February 1998, November 1999 (for 2000 publication) and January 2002).  Panel A 
shows descriptive statistics for changes in the entrenchment index from September 1990 through January 
2002.  Panel B shows regressions of portfolios formed by entrenchment index changes on a four factor 
model.  Panel B shows regressions on the factor model contemporaneous with the change in the 
entrenchment index.  In Panel C, changes in the entrenchment index are scaled by the average 
entrenchment index value for adjacent IRRC publications.  Firms are ranked by quintiles each publication 
year within the sample of negative or positive scaled changes in the entrenchment index.  The 
LiberateBCF portfolio includes the quintile of firms with the largest scaled decrease in the entrenchment 
index.  The Lock-UpBCF portfolio includes the quintile of firms with the largest scaled increase in the 
entrenchment index.  RMRF is the monthly value weighted return of the CRSP universe less the return on 
a one month treasury bill.  SMB is the return on small stocks minus the return on big stocks.  HML is the 
return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks.  SMB and HML are 
detailed in Fama and French (1993), pg. 9.  Momentum is the return on high past return stocks minus the 
return on low past return stocks.  Momentum is detailed in Carhart (1997), pg. 61.  alpha measures the 
abnormal returns to holding any portolio.  All returns are monthly, value weighted, and in excess of the 
return on a one month treasury bill.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance at the five 
and one percent levels is indicated by * and ** respectively.   
 
Panel A:  Changes in the entrenchment index (Sep. 1990 to January 2002) 
 
Change in the Entrenchment Index Frequency Percent 
-4 1 0.02 
-3 5 0.08 
-2 31 0.50 
-1 353 5.64 
0 4736 75.70 
1 974 15.57 
2 133 2.13 
3 21 0.34 
4 2 0.03 
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Table 15 (Continued) 
 
Panel B:  Portfolio returns contemporaneous with changes in the entrenchment index (Sep. 1990 to 
January 2002) 
 
Portfolio alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
Decrease E by 3 or more -0.78 1.08** 0.18 0.90* 0.12 
 (0.99) (0.28) (0.40) (0.41) (0.28) 
      
Decrease E by less than 3 0.10** 0.99** -0.15** 0.03* -0.01 
Increase E by less than 3 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Increase E by 3 or more 1.18 1.05** 1.59** -0.19 0.16 
 (0.96) (0.27) (0.26) (0.34) (0.14) 
      
Decrease E by 2 or more -0.25 1.14** -0.05 -0.19 -0.42** 
 (0.57) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.08) 
      
Decrease E by less than 2 0.11** 0.99** -0.15** 0.03* 0.00 
Increase E by less than 2 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Increase E by 2 or more 0.43 0.82** 0.18 -0.05 0.09* 
 (0.30) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.05) 
      
Decrease E by 1 or more -0.15 1.12** -0.04 0.13 -0.09** 
 (0.20) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) 
      
Decrease E by less than 1 0.16** 0.99** -0.16** 0.02 0.00 
Increase E by less than 1 (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
      
Increase E by 1 or more -0.02 0.96** -0.09* 0.02 -0.02 
 (0.13) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
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Table 15 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Portfolios formed on scaled changes in the entrenchment index (Sep. 1990 to January 2002) 
 
Portfolio alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
LiberateBCF 0.38 1.13** -0.09 -0.15 -0.14** 
 (0.34) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.05) 
      
-4 -0.18 1.09** 0.05 0.37** -0.01 
 (0.36) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.05) 
      
-3 -0.24 0.99** -0.14 0.55** -0.05 
 (0.34) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.05) 
      
-2 -0.55 0.90** 0.34** 0.05 0.07 
 (0.29) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08) 
      
-1 -0.43 1.30** -0.16 0.79** -0.05 
 (0.47) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.07) 
      
No Change 0.16** 0.99** -0.16** 0.02 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
      
1 -0.77* 1.23** 0.08 0.73** 0.04 
 (0.36) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.05) 
      
2 -0.10 0.89** -0.04 0.50** 0.06 
 (0.23) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) 
      
3 -0.29 1.01** -0.15 -0.17 -0.08 
 (0.28) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.04) 
      
4 -0.42* 1.09** 0.02 0.36** 0.02 
 (0.20) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) 
      
Lock-UpBCF 0.54* 0.94** -0.12 -0.12 -0.04 
 (0.26) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) 
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 So far, moves towards worse governance are accompanied by abnormal increases 
in firm value.  Next, I examine whether model misspecification may affect the results for 
returns contemporaneous with changes in the value of governance indices.  I form 
control firm portfolios based on size, book-to-market, and momentum for governance 
index change portfolios.  These matching characteristics are the same dimensions used 
for matching to governance index level portfolios when looking at long-term abnormal 
returns.  I examine the returns to portfolios with an increase or decrease of five or more 
governance index values between releases by the IRRC.  For the portfolio with a 
governance index increase of five or more, I select matching control firms out of the 
sample that has a governance index increase of less than five.  Likewise, for the portfolio 
with a governance index decrease of five or more, I select matching control firms out of 
the sample that has a decrease of less than five.  In Panel A and B of Table 16, control 
firm adjusted portfolios formed on governance index decreases of five or more have 
greater contemporaneous returns than unadjusted portfolios.  More noticeably, Panels C 
and D of Table 16 show significantly negative contemporaneous returns for control firm 
adjusted portfolios formed on governance index increases of five or more.  This suggests 
that the addition of anti-takeover amendments entrenches corporate managers and that 
investors recognize the resulting value destruction.  The control firm adjusted Liberate 
portfolio also has contemporaneous returns that are much greater than the unadjusted 
Liberate portfolio.  Contemporaneous abnormal returns from the control firm adjusted 
Lock-Up portfolio are negative but insignificant.   
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Table 16 
Control Firm Adjusted Portfolios Formed on Large Changes in the Governance Index. 
 Changes in the governance index are calculated every time new IRRC data is released (July 1993, 
July 1995, February 1998, November 1999 (for 2000 publication) and January 2002).  All control firm 
portfolios are formed at the beginning of the release of IRRC data (September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, 
February 1998, and November 1999).  Panel A shows the control firm adjusted intertemporal average of 
returns to the DecreaseG5+ portfolio.  Panel B shows control firm adjusted calendar time regressions for 
the DecreaseG5+ portfolio.  The DecreaseG5+ portfolio includes firms whose governance index decreases 
by 5 or more between releases of data by the IRRC.  To form the CTRL-DecreaseG5+ portfolio, firms 
whose governance index does not decrease by five or more are matched to DecreaseG5+ firms on size, 
book-to-market, and momentum.  CTRL-DecreaseG5+ firms within 60% to 140% of a DecreaseG5+  
firm’s book-to-market and all CTRL- DecreaseG5+  firms within 90% to 110% of a DecreaseG5+ firm’s 
momentum are kept.  Finally, control firms with the closest size are kept.  Panel C shows the control firm 
adjusted intertemporal average of returns to the IncreaseG5+ portfolio.  Panel D shows control firm 
adjusted calendar time regressions for the IncreaseG5+ portfolio.  The IncreaseG5+ portfolio includes 
firms whose governance index increases by 5 or more between releases of data by the IRRC.  A CTRL-
IncreaseG5+ portfolio is formed in a similar fashion to the CTRL-DecreaseG5+ portfolio.   
 Panel E shows the control firm adjusted intertemporal average of returns to the Liberate portfolio.  
Panel F shows control firm adjusted calendar time regressions for the Liberate portfolio.  Firms are ranked 
by quintiles each publication year within the sample of negative or positive changes in the governance 
index.  The Liberate portfolio includes the quintile of firms with the largest scaled decrease in the 
governance index.  To form the CTRL-Liberate portfolio, firms that are not in the quintile of firms with 
the largest scaled decrease in the governance index are matched to Liberate firms on size, book-to-market, 
and momentum.  CTRL-Liberate firms within 60% to 140% of a Liberate firm’s book-to-market and all 
CTRL-Liberate firms within 90% to 110% of a Liberate firm’s momentum are kept.  Finally, control firms 
with the closest size are kept.  Panel G shows the control firm adjusted intertemporal average of returns to 
the Lock-Up portfolio.  Panel H shows control firm adjusted calendar time regressions for the Lock-Up 
portfolio.  The Lock-Up portfolio includes the quintile of firms with the largest scaled increase in the 
governance index.  The CTRL-Lock-Up portfolio is formed in a fashion similar to the CTRL-Liberate 
portfolio.  RMRF is the monthly value weighted return of the CRSP universe less the return on a one 
month treasury bill.  SMB is the return on small stocks minus the return on big stocks.  HML is the return 
on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks.  SMB and HML are 
detailed in Fama and French (1993), pg. 9.  Momentum is the return on high past return stocks minus the 
return on low past return stocks.  Momentum is detailed in Carhart (1997), pg. 61.  alpha measures the 
abnormal returns to holding any portolio.  All returns are monthly, value weighted, and in excess of the 
return on a one month treasury bill.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance at the five-
percent and one-percent levels is indicated by * and ** respectively.   
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Table 16 (Continued) 
 
Panel A: Adjusted Intertemporal Average of Decreases in G Index by 5 or More Portfolio (Sep. 1990 
to January 2002) 
 
Portfolio Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
DecreaseG5+ - CTRL-DecreaseG5+ 0.81 7.72 -19.09 21.73 
 (t=1.12)    
 (p=0.267)    
 
Panel B: Adjusted Regressions of Decreases in G Index by 5 or More Portfolio (Sep. 1990 to January 
2002) 
 
Portfolio alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
DecreaseG5+ - CTRL-DecreaseG5+ 0.75 0.03 0.04 -0.55 0.00 
 (0.80) (0.23) (0.28) (0.32) (0.20) 
 
Panel C: Adjusted Intertemporal Average of Increases in G Index by 5 or More Portfolio (Sep. 1990 
to January 2002) 
 
Portfolio Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
IncreaseG5+ - CTRL-IncreaseG5+ -1.36 5.08 -20.08 8.44 
  (t=-2.84)    
 (p=0.005)    
 
Panel D: Adjusted Regressions of Increases in G Index by 5 or More Portfolio (Sep. 1990 to January 
2002) 
 
Portfolio alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
IncreaseG5+ - CTRL-IncreaseG5+ -1.27* -0.16 0.16 0.32 0.14 
 0.52 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.13 
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Table 16 (Continued) 
 
Panel E: Adjusted Intertemporal Average of G Index Liberate Portfolio  (Sep. 1990 to January 
2002) 
 
Portfolio Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Liberate - CTRL-Liberate 0.43 3.62 -7.39 13.68 
 (t=1.27)    
 (p=0.207)    
 
Panel F: Adjusted Regressions of G Index Liberate Portfolio (Sep. 1990 to January 2002) 
 
Portfolio alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
Liberate - CTRL-Liberate 0.59 -0.05 -0.41** -0.16 -0.13 
 (0.37) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.09) 
 
Panel G: Adjusted Intertemporal Average of G Index Lock-Up Portfolio  (Sep. 1990 to January 
2002) 
 
Portfolio Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
LockUp - CTRL-LockUp -0.21 2.67 -9.25 9.41 
  (t=-0.82)    
 (p=0.411)    
 
Panel H: Adjusted Regressions of G Index Lock-Up Portfolio (Sep. 1990 to January 2002) 
 
Portfolio alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
LockUp - CTRL-LockUp -0.11 -0.10 0.06 0.23* 0.05 
 (0.27) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) 
 
 
 
 Since magnitudes and signs of contemporaneous abnormal returns change after 
control firm adjustment, model misspecification may be an important consideration in 
examining contemporaneous abnormal returns.  In Table 17, portfolios formed on 
changes in the entrenchment index used in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) are 
adjusted with control firm portfolios.  I examine the returns to portfolios with an increase 
or decrease of three or more entrenchment index values between releases by the IRRC.  
For the portfolio with an entrenchment index increase of three or more, I select control 
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firms that have an entrenchment index increase of less than three and that have similar 
book-to-market ratios before the change in the index.  Likewise, for the portfolio with an 
entrenchment index decrease of three or more, I select control firms that have an index 
decrease of less than three and that have similar momentum before the change in the 
index.  Control firm portfolios for entrenchment index change portfolios are formed 
along the same dimensions as for the entrenchment index level portfolios used in 
measuring long-term abnormal returns.  Momentum is used to find control firms for 
DemocracyBCF firms and for firms that move to better governance.  Book-to-market is 
used to find control firms for DictatorshipBCF firms and for firms that move to worse 
governance.  In Panels A and B of Table 17, control firm adjusted portfolios formed on 
entrenchment index decreases of three or more have negative contemporaneous 
abnormal returns.  In Panels C and D of Table 17, control firm adjusted portfolios 
formed on entrenchment index decreases of three or more have positive 
contemporaneous abnormal returns.  Control firm adjusted portfolios formed on changes 
in the entrenchment index have contemporaneous abnormal returns similar to unadjusted 
portfolios formed on changes in the entrenchment index.  A valuation increase for moves 
towards worse governance for both adjusted and unadjusted portfolios is perplexing.  In 
Panels E and F of Table 17, control firm adjusted LiberateBCF portfolios have negative 
contemporaneous abnormal returns.  Comparatively, control firm adjusted Lock-UpBCF 
portfolios have negative abnormal returns that are larger in magnitude.  The adjusted 
regression intercept of the Lock-UpBCF portfolio is negative and significant.  The more 
negative and significant contemporaneous abnormal returns for the control firm adjusted 
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Lock-UpBCF portfolio suggest that moves towards worse governance destroy value.  
However, the negative sign for the adjusted LiberateBCF portfolio is puzzling. 
 
 
Table 17 
Control Firm Adjusted Portfolios Formed on Large Changes in the Entrenchment Index. 
 Changes in the entrenchment index are calculated every time new IRRC data is released (July 
1993, July 1995, February 1998, November 1999 (for 2000 publication) and January 2002).  All control 
firm portfolios are formed at the beginning of the release of IRRC data (September 1990, July 1993, July 
1995, February 1998, and November 1999).  Panel A shows the control firm adjusted intertemporal 
average of returns to the DecreaseE3+ portfolio.  Panel B shows control firm adjusted calendar time 
regressions for the DecreaseE3+ portfolio.  The DecreaseE3+ portfolio includes firms whose entrenchment 
index decreases by 3 or more between releases of data by the IRRC.  To form the CTRL-DecreaseE3+ 
portfolio, firms whose entrenchment index does not decrease by three or more are matched to 
DecreaseE3+ firms on momentum.  Panel C shows the control firm adjusted intertemporal average of 
returns to the IncreaseE3+ portfolio.  Panel D shows control firm adjusted calendar time regressions for 
the IncreaseE3+ portfolio.  The IncreaseE3+ portfolio includes firms whose entrenchment index increases 
by 3 or more between releases of data by the IRRC.  To form the CTRL- IncreaseE3+ portfolio, firms 
whose entrenchment index does not increase by three or more are matched to IncreaseE3+ firms on book-
to-market.   
 Panel E shows the control firm adjusted intertemporal average of returns to the LiberateBCF 
portfolio.  Panel F shows control firm adjusted calendar time regressions for the LiberateBCF portfolio.  
Firms are ranked by quintiles each IRRC publication year within the sample of negative or positive scaled 
changes in the entrenchment index.  Changes in the entrenchment index are scaled by the average 
entrenchment index value between two consecutive IRRC publication releases.  The LiberateBCF 
portfolio is the quintile of firms with the largest scaled decrease in the entrenchment index.  To form the 
CTRL-LiberateBCF portfolio firms not in the quintile of firms with the largest scaled decrease in the 
entrenchment index are matched to LiberateBCF firms on momentum.  Panel G shows the control firm 
adjusted intertemporal average of returns to the Lock-UpBCF portfolio.  Panel H shows control firm 
adjusted calendar time regressions for the Lock-UpBCF portfolio.  The Lock-UpBCF portfolio is the 
quintile of firms with the largest scaled increase in the entrenchment index.  To form the CTRL-Lock-
UpBCF portfolio firms not in the quintile of firms with the largest scaled increase in the entrenchment 
index are matched to Lock-UpBCF firms on book-to-market.    RMRF is the monthly value weighted 
return of the CRSP universe less the return on a one month treasury bill.  SMB is the return on small stocks 
minus the return on big stocks.  HML is the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low 
book-to-market stocks.  SMB and HML are detailed in Fama and French (1993), pg. 9.  Momentum is the 
return on high past return stocks minus the return on low past return stocks.  Momentum is detailed in 
Carhart (1997), pg. 61.  alpha measures the abnormal returns to holding any portolio.  All returns are 
monthly, value weighted, and in excess of the return on a one month treasury bill.  Standard errors are 
shown in parentheses and significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels is indicated by * and ** 
respectively.   
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Table 17 (Continued) 
 
Panel A: Adjusted Intertemporal Average of Decreases in Entrenchment Index by 3 or More 
Portfolio (Sep. 1990 to January 2002) 
 
Portfolio Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
DecreaseE3+ - CTRL-DecreaseE3+ -0.32 9.66 -29.72 25.43 
  (t=-0.23)    
 (p=0.809)    
 
Panel B: Adjusted Regressions of Decreases in Entrenchment Index by 3 or More Portfolio (Sep. 
1990 to January 2002) 
 
Portfolio alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
DecreaseE3+ - CTRL-DecreaseE3+ -1.14 0.57 -0.76 0.83 0.07 
 (1.36) (0.36) (0.53) (0.52) (0.36) 
 
Panel C: Adjusted Intertemporal Average of Increases in Entrenchment Index by 3 or More 
Portfolio (Sep. 1990 to January 2002) 
 
Portfolio Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
IncreaseE3+ - CTRL-IncreaseE3+ 0.23 7.50 -21.97 40.64 
 (t=0.32)    
 (p=0.747)    
 
Panel D: Adjusted Regressions of Increases in Entrenchment Index by 3 or More Portfolio (Sep. 
1990 to January 2002) 
 
Portfolio alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
IncreaseE3+ - CTRL-IncreaseE3+ 0.80 -0.18 -0.34 0.08 -0.39* 
 (0.77) (0.22) (0.27) (0.31) (0.20) 
 
Panel E: Adjusted Intertemporal Average of Entrenchment Index Liberate Portfolio  (Sep. 1990 to 
January 2002) 
 
Portfolio Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
LiberateBCF - CTRL-LiberateBCF -0.12 7.61 -29.72 25.43 
  (t=-0.16)    
 (p=0.868)    
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Table 17 (continued) 
 
Panel F: Adjusted Regressions of Entrenchment Index Liberate Portfolio (Sep. 1990 to January 
2002) 
 
Portfolio alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
LiberateBCF - CTRL-LiberateBCF -0.50 0.18 -0.15 0.02 0.17 
 (0.80) (0.23) (0.28) (0.32) (0.20) 
 
Panel G: Adjusted Intertemporal Average of Entrenchment Index Lock-Up Portfolio  (Sep. 1990 to 
January 2002) 
 
Portfolio Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
LockUpBCF - CTRL-LockUpBCF -0.72 3.33 -17.40 7.26 
  (t=-2.28)    
 (p=0.024)    
 
Panel H: Adjusted Regressions of G Index Lock-Up Portfolio (Sep. 1990 to January 2002) 
 
Portfolio alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
LockUpBCF - CTRL-LockUpBCF -0.69* 0.06 0.10 0.28* -0.09 
 (0.34) (0.10) (0.12) (0.14) (0.09) 
 
 
 
 Since few firms have entrenchment index changes of three or more, inferences 
from portfolios formed on changes of three or more may be problematic.  To mitigate 
the problem of few firms, I explore control firm adjusted returns to portfolios formed on 
entrenchment index changes of two or more.  In Table 18, control firm adjusted 
portfolios formed on index decreases still have negative contemporaneous abnormal 
returns.  The returns for the portfolios formed on entrenchment index decreases are less 
negative than portfolios formed on index decreases.  The more negative 
contemporaneous abnormal returns for moves towards worse governance are consistent 
with value destroying effects for entrenching corporate managers.  
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Table 18 
Control Firm Adjusted Portfolios for Changes of Two or More in the Entrenchment Index. 
 Changes in the entrenchment index are calculated every time new IRRC data is released (July 
1993, July 1995, February 1998, November 1999 (for 2000 publication) and January 2002).  All control 
firm portfolios are formed at the beginning of the release of IRRC data (September 1990, July 1993, July 
1995, February 1998, and November 1999).  Panel A shows the control firm adjusted intertemporal 
average of returns to the DecreaseE2+ portfolio.  Panel B shows control firm adjusted calendar time 
regressions for the DecreaseE2+ portfolio.  The DecreaseE2+ portfolio includes firms whose entrenchment 
index decreases by 2 or more between releases of data by the IRRC.  To form the CTRL-DecreaseE2+ 
portfolio, firms whose entrenchment index does not decrease by two or more are matched to DecreaseE2+ 
firms on momentum.  Panel C shows the control firm adjusted intertemporal average of returns to the 
IncreaseE2+ portfolio.  Panel D shows control firm adjusted calendar time regressions for the IncreaseE2+ 
portfolio.  The IncreaseE2+ portfolio includes firms whose entrenchment index increases by 2 or more 
between releases of data by the IRRC.  To form the CTRL- IncreaseE2+ portfolio, firms whose 
entrenchment index does not increase by two or more are matched to IncreaseE2+ firms on book-to-
market.  RMRF is the monthly value weighted return of the CRSP universe less the return on a one month 
treasury bill.  SMB is the return on small stocks minus the return on big stocks.  HML is the return on high 
book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks.  SMB and HML are detailed in 
Fama and French (1993), pg. 9.  Momentum is the return on high past return stocks minus the return on 
low past return stocks.  Momentum is detailed in Carhart (1997), pg. 61.  alpha measures the abnormal 
returns to holding any portolio.  All returns are monthly, value weighted, and in excess of the return on a 
one month treasury bill.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance at the five-percent and 
one-percent levels is indicated by * and ** respectively.   
 
Panel A: Adjusted Intertemporal Average of Decreases in Entrenchment Index by 2 or More 
Portfolio (Sep. 1990 to January 2002) 
 
Portfolio Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
DecreaseE2+ - CTRL-DecreaseE2+ -0.05 7.75 -29.72 25.43 
  (t=-0.06)    
 (p=0.941)    
 
Panel B: Adjusted Regressions of Decreases in Entrenchment Index by 2 or More Portfolio (Sep. 
1990 to January 2002) 
 
Portfolio alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
DecreaseE2+ - CTRL-DecreaseE2+ -0.40 0.13 -0.08 0.09 0.20 
 (0.81) (0.23) (0.28) (0.33) (0.21) 
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Table 18 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Adjusted Intertemporal Average of Increases in Entrenchment Index by 2 or More 
Portfolio (Sep. 1990 to January 2002) 
 
Portfolio Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
IncreaseE2+ - CTRL-IncreaseE2+ -0.66 3.96 -23.89 7.80 
  (t=-1.76)    
 (p=0.080)    
 
Panel D: Adjusted Regressions of Increases in Entrenchment Index by 2 or More Portfolio (Sep. 
1990 to January 2002) 
 
Portfolio alpha RMRF SMB HML Momentum 
IncreaseE2+ - CTRL-IncreaseE2+ -0.58 0.07 -0.21 0.12 -0.18 
 (0.41) (0.12) (0.14) (0.16) (0.10) 
 
 
 
 From looking at abnormal returns contemporaneous with changes in governance 
indices, the use of control firm portfolios seems important for inferences.  Looking at 
unadjusted portfolios, contemporaneous abnormal returns are always positive and 
greater for moves towards worse governance.  This counterintuitive result might suggest 
that the addition of anti-takeover amendments has significant benefits.  The benefits of 
adding anti-takeover amendments could be greater than any costs.  After correcting for 
possible model misspecification using control firm portfolios, contemporaneous 
abnormal returns are seldom positive and usually smaller for moves towards worse 
governance.  Occasionally, moves towards worse governance are accompanied by 
significantly negative contemporaneous abnormal returns.  Hence, the methodology used 
is powerful enough to pick up value destroying effects of entrenchment.  However, 
moving towards better governance sometimes results in negative contemporaneous 
abnormal returns for control firm adjusted portfolios.  This prevents strong conclusions 
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about the causality of any correlation between adding anti-takeover amendments and 
value destruction.  A modest conclusion from the control firm adjusted results would be 
that poor governance destroys firm value but most firms choose a governance structure 
well fit to their agency cost environment.  Firms that subtracted anti-takeover 
amendments sometimes have negative contemporaneous abnormal returns even after 
control firm adjustment.  Anti-takeover amendments may not be without their benefits, 
and a uniform prescription of governance for all firms may not be appropriate.  This 
conclusion might be seen as weak to those with strong priors in support of the ability of 
governance to improve firm value.  The tests I have shown may be critiqued on the basis 
of power, matching precision, and construction of the governance index.  However, a 
lack of strong results for the causal relation of governance and firm value is consistent 
with the extant literature.  In particular, the contemporaneous pricing evidence is 
consistent with much of the short-term event study evidence for anti-takeover 
amendment additions and deletions (see Coates 2000).  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
4.1 Implications for the Efficient Markets Hypothesis 
  
 Extant literature beginning with Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) finds that a 
trading strategy long in firms with “good governance” and short in firms with “poor 
governance” earns long-run abnormal stock returns.  This result has received much 
attention from the media and academics.  However, long-run abnormal returns for a 
strategy based on publicly available information about corporate governance are 
inconsistent with semi-strong form efficient markets.  Anomalous returns to the 
governance based strategy are attributed to unexpected agency costs (Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick 2003) and risk (Cremers and Nair 2004) among other explanations.  It must 
be noted that long-run event studies are affected by the joint hypothesis problem.  
Whenever market efficiency is rejected, the ability of an asset pricing model to explain 
returns may also be called into question (Fama 1998).  A reasonable change in 
methodology that amounts to a correction of the asset pricing model may mitigate the 
joint hypothesis.  Mitchell and Stafford (2000) propose the use of control firm portfolios 
as such a solution.   
 The implications of my findings are limited by the research objective I have 
chosen.  I set out to explore whether past research did not fully account for potential 
model misspecification.  Are the long-term abnormal returns to a governance strategy 
related to characteristics besides governance that explain the cross-section of stock 
returns?  I present and discuss results that show portfolios with similar characteristics 
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besides governance have similar returns.  I do not claim that any of the matching 
procedures I have shown are the true model for expected returns.  Finding the true model 
of expected returns is outside the scope of this paper and remains a question for future 
research.  Extant literature gives less than perfect guidance towards a true model of 
expected returns.  Extant literature also guides less than perfectly in finding matching 
firms for control firm portfolios.  Propensity score matching is promising in providing a 
good matching method and another way to measure abnormal returns; however, the 
propensity score method does not suggest exactly what variables should be used to 
calculate propensity scores in a logit regression.  A stochastic dominance criterion 
provides an entirely different perspective on understanding long-term stock returns.     
 Instead of coming up with a model of expected returns, I use control firm 
portfolios.  The control firm portfolio methodology is not a perfect substitute for the true 
model of expected returns.  Control firm portfolios have characteristics other than 
governance highly correlated with the characteristics of governance portfolios.  The 
characteristics highly correlated between the two portfolios are characteristics that help 
explain the cross section of returns.  Returns related to these characteristics should be 
captured by the factor model used to measure expected returns.  However, model 
misspecification makes factor model results less reliable.  If governance generates 
abnormal returns, I would expect the following: Returns to governance portfolios should 
be different from the returns of any portfolio with similar characteristics besides 
governance – especially with characteristics known to be related to the cross-section of 
stock returns.  I have demonstrated that this is not the case with portfolios that have 
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similar characteristics known to be related to returns.  For some, this may be a hurdle 
that is too high.  However, any criterion for abnormal returns less demanding may 
present an obstacle in coming to a better understanding of the return generating process.  
What generates returns?  
 It is possible for a researcher to explore the governance anomaly with a method 
like propensity score matching and find abnormal returns to a governance strategy.1 
According to propensity score theory, this would suggest that firms earned abnormal 
returns if they chose better governance.  This would raise a number of questions.  Which 
methodology accurately measures abnormal returns?  If the propensity score 
methodology correctly measures abnormal returns, why did the methodology I use 
generate returns similar to governance firms?  Some of my matches were done on only 
one dimension.  Does the propensity score methodology emphasize many dimensions 
when only a few dimensions or one dimension may be important?   
 After using control firm portfolios matched to governance portfolios on 
characteristics known to explain the cross-section of stock returns, I find no abnormal 
returns to a governance based strategy.  Asset pricing models appear to underestimate 
the returns to firms with good governance and overestimate the returns to firms with 
poor governance.  Firms with good governance have characteristics in common with 
firms that did well in the 1990s and firms with bad governance have characteristics in 
common with firms that did poorly in the 1990s.  This result suggests that information 
about corporate governance is impounded quickly into equity prices.  The quick 
reflection of public information in security prices is consistent with semi-strong efficient 
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markets.  The result is a drop in a large bucket of research testing the efficient markets 
hypothesis.  Finding that model correction offers a result consistent with the efficient 
markets hypothesis is consistent with a growing literature on long-run event study 
methodology.  The long-run event study methodology literature continues to offer new 
and perhaps better ways of mitigating the joint hypothesis problem. 
 Researchers and practitioners often have strong priors regarding market 
efficiency.  Absent any theories relating governance to systematic risks, the efficient 
markets hypothesis offers the best a priori explanation of the relation between 
governance and long-term stock returns.  Information believed to impact the amount of 
cash flows to shareholders should be quickly impounded into stock prices.  This clear 
prediction of the efficient markets hypothesis is one reason why the extant literature on 
governance and long-run abnormal stock returns is puzzling and interesting.  The finding 
of no long-run abnormal returns to a governance strategy in this study is across a number 
of matching procedures and governance indices.  Since the result is consistent with the 
efficient markets hypothesis, it is expected and not puzzling.  However, questions still 
remain.  Why do firms with poor governance have characteristics besides governance in 
common with firms that did well in the 1990s?  Why do firms with poor governance 
have characteristics in common with firms that did poorly in the 1990s?  The governance 
anomaly deserves more attention before it can be considered a closed case.                
4.2 Implications for Various Governance Views 
 
 A central result of this research is detecting no long-term abnormal returns to 
trading strategies based on governance.  Firms with better governance have other 
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characteristics in common with firms that did well in the 1990s.  This result is consistent 
with the efficient markets hypothesis.  If this were not the case, it would be difficult to 
make any inferences about the effect of governance on firm value.  Firm values would 
not accurately reflect information about corporate governance if governance were not 
correctly priced. 
 Much of the extant literature on the effect of corporate governance on firm value 
assumes that public information about corporate governance is fully reflected in market 
prices.  Suggesting this might not be the case by finding long-run abnormal returns to a 
strategy based on governance would call into question the accuracy of past studies.  On 
the contrary, finding markets are efficient with respect to information about corporate 
governance supports the inferences of prior governance research.  Research examining 
the relation between firm value and governance through event studies, Tobin’s Q, and 
operating performance can be relied upon.   
 A second result in this paper is that moves towards worse governance are usually 
accompanied by contemporaneous negative abnormal returns after control firm 
adjustment.  Sometimes, the contemporaneous market reaction is significantly negative.  
Occasionally, moves towards better governance are accompanied by contemporaneous 
negative abnormal returns after control firm adjustment.  This evidence supports the 
view that governance affects firm value.  Moves towards worse governance seem to 
effectively destroy firm value, while moves towards better governance have an unclear 
effect.  The asymmetry of the relationship between governance and firm value lends 
itself to a cautious interpretation of the causal nature of governance.  Anti-takeover 
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amendments may have large costs, but they are not without benefits as well.  Simply 
removing anti-takeover amendments does not boost firm value to statistically noticeable 
levels and appears to have value destroying affects (though not statistically significant) 
in some instances.  Thus, the costs and benefits nuance of the effect of governance on 
firm value receives support.  The difficulty in detecting an empirical relationship 
between governance and firm value robust in statistical significance and sign lends itself 
to the nuance that most firms have optimal governance structures.  The lack of statistical 
significance and similar signs across all governance changes in a single direction 
prevents an interpretation suggesting that a single optimal governance structure exists for 
all firms.  Somewhere in between the costs and benefits nuance and the optimality 
nuance would best describe the place along the continuum of governance views where 
the evidence lands.  Moves towards worse governance are almost always accompanied 
by negative abnormal returns, making it difficult to support the view that governance 
does not affect firm value.  The contemporaneous abnormal returns with moves towards 
worse governance range from 9.6 to a negative16.32 percent on an annual basis, making 
it difficult to asses the impact of governance.  Excluding the positive contemporaneous 
abnormal returns for moves towards worse governance, an average annual 
contemporaneous abnormal return of negative 8.4 percent seems non-trivial.  A 
methodology similar to Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2004) may be more appropriate 
for assessing the relative importance of the effect of governance.                       
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4.3 Implications for Researchers in General 
 
 Throughout this study control firm methodology was used.  Control firms were 
used initially to mitigate the joint hypothesis problem in long run studies.  After using 
control firms, no long-run abnormal returns were found for trading strategies based on 
governance.  Control firms were also used for examining contemporaneous market 
reactions to changes in governance.  Since the asset pricing model could not explain 
returns to portfolios it was designed for (Fama and French 1996), inferences from a 
misspecified model are not without difficulty.  After using control firms, test results 
were no longer strongly consistent with the perplexing idea that entrenchment improves 
firm value.  Instead, moves towards worse governance showed evidence of value 
destruction.   
 In both long run event study tests and contemporaneous market reaction tests, the 
results were different after using control firms.  At a minimum, researchers should 
consider evidence from research that employs a control sample in addition to any 
evidence without a control sample.  For researchers using long-run event studies to test 
market efficiency, this has particular importance since the joint hypothesis is a known 
problem.  Researchers should be quite confident in the robustness of an asset pricing 
model’s explanatory power in random samples before rejecting market efficiency.  A 
possible way to “add confidence” to a model is to find control firms based on model 
parameters. 
 Another implication of this research is that governance has minimal importance 
in explaining the cross-section of returns since governance strategies do not generate 
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abnormal returns after controlling for size, book-to-market, and momentum.  Instead, 
characteristics found to explain the cross-section of returns in past research are still 
important in understanding long-run stock returns (Fama and French 1992 and Jegadeesh 
and Titman 1993).  This is notable in a sample period when the premiums for size and 
book-to-market have diminished (see Schwert 2002 and Malkiel 2003).  Two directions 
may be appropriate for researchers.  First, a better understanding of size, book-to-
market, and momentum is needed since these characteristics are important in explaining 
the return cross-section.    Berk (1995) suggests that if book-to-market and size are still 
important in explaining returns, model specification has a long way to go.  The second 
direction for researchers may be to develop asset pricing models that are better specified.       
4.4 Implications for Practitioners 
 
 After using control firm portfolios, no long-run abnormal returns are found for 
strategies based on governance.  This implies that investors seeking optimal asset 
allocation should be indifferent between portfolios of differing governance quality.  
Portfolios of differing governance quality earn their required rates of return or cost of 
equity capital.  Recommending indifference to corporate governance in the asset 
allocation process may run counter to the recent growth in corporate governance indices 
and other governance related services targeted to investors.  However, indifference to 
corporate governance is consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis.  Investors 
would be better off allocating assets according to characteristics with independent 
explanatory power for the cross-section of stock returns.  Portfolios with similar 
characteristics other than governance earn similar returns.   
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 Finding no long-run abnormal returns to a governance strategy also has 
implications for corporate managers.  Managers will not be able to fool the market by 
trying to implement “complex” governance structures.  The market understands the 
agency costs associated with poor governance.  Since the market understands the 
consequences of a particular governance structure, managers will not be able to delay the 
adverse effects of a change towards worse governance.       
 Governance appears to affect firm value, but the result is not statistically robust.  
If governance strongly affected firm value, a large investor or corporate manager might 
hope to improve firm value by tinkering with governance.  The mixed effects on 
valuation for moves towards better governance imply that getting better governance by 
decreasing anti-takeover amendments is not without its costs.  In addition to the costs 
inherent in a particular governance structure, there may be costs of implementing a 
particular governance structure.  Although adding and subtracting anti-takeover 
amendments seem to be relatively costless procedures, the costs of implementing new 
governance structures should be understood in addition to the costs of having a particular 
governance structure. 
4.5 Implications for Policy Makers 
 
 Finding no long run abnormal returns to a governance strategy is consistent with 
the efficient market hypothesis.  The efficient markets hypothesis suggests that security 
prices are informative for understanding the effects of governance.  Since market prices 
are informative, policy makers can rely on market data in addition to other information 
in forming policy.  If market prices were not informative, policy decisions might rely on 
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the idiosyncratic assessments of a few individuals.  Useful market information allows 
policy makers to rely on more systematic evidence in policy making. 
 Investors appear to understand the impact of governance on firm value.  Public 
information about governance is quickly impounded into security prices.  Since investors 
understand the impact of corporate governance on firm value, should corporate 
governance standards be mandated by law?  If poor corporate governance structures had 
adverse consequences investors were unaware of, it might be reasonable to call for 
legislatively mandated corporate governance structures.  Since investors are able to and 
do quickly “walk away” from a corporation moving towards worse governance, 
investors do not need legal protection from a non-existent unforeseen danger.   
 If the contemporaneous market reactions to moves towards worse governance are 
interpreted strongly as value destroying, limiting the ability of corporations to add anti-
takeover amendments would make shareholders better off.  However, a lack of statistical 
robustness in the results prevents such a strong interpretation.  It is more likely that 
particular governance structures have costs and benefits, and corporations may even tend 
toward optimal governance structures.  A more modest interpretation of the evidence 
implies that policy makers should be more laissez faire with respect to corporate 
governance.  
4.6 Summary 
 
 The general findings and implications of this research are not new.  As new long-
run event study methodology has been developed, many researchers have found previous 
anomalies not be anomalies at all.  Instead, a reasonable change in methodology often 
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provides an explanation consistent with efficient markets.  Despite the development of 
new methodologies, researchers are still left without the most important item in 
understand returns – a model of true expected returns.  Questions regarding the return 
generating process will likely remain a fruitful area for future research.  Mixed results 
with respect to the effect of governance on firm value may be said to describe the 
governance literature as a whole.  As a result, researchers have concluded that 
governance structures are often chosen in accordance with an agency cost environment.  
What is left for future research is exactly how governance is chosen to match a specific 
agency cost environment.  Despite consistency with extant literature, these results and 
their interpretation will be controversial in a discipline where many hold strong priors 
about market efficiency and the impact of corporate governance.  The evidence 
presented is a small portion of the research on market efficiency and corporate 
governance.  Conclusions about market efficiency and the impact of corporate 
governance on firm value should come from a broad examination of the financial 
economics literature.  
4.7 Notes 
1. I would conjecture that abnormal returns using the propensity score methodology 
would be highly unlikely but not impossible.  Since I have shown that firms with similar 
characteristics to governance firms have similar returns, I would expect the propensity 
score method to identify similar firms.  The propensity score method is also a matching 
method looking for common characteristics between test firms and control firms.      
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